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Patrimony 
C. B. GRAY* 
L'importance nouvelle accordée au concept de patrimoine par l'Office 
de révision du Code civil prend pour point de départ le concept opposé de 
personne. Dans le but d'éclairer la nature exacte de cette opposition, la 
présente étude se penche sur l'évolution du concept de patrimoine du droit 
romain à nos jours. C'est ainsi que de la notion de Patrimonium, dont l'unité 
est avant tout procédurale, l'auteur remonte au Code Napoléon qui lui ne 
traite qu'accidentellement du patrimoine dans une perspective davantage 
utilitariste que transcendentale. L'auteur aborde ensuite les commentateurs 
du Code, en particulier Aubry et Rau, Zachariae et Savigny, lesquels éla-
borent une véritable théorie du patrimoine. Avec le Code civil du Bas-Canada, 
enfin, qui tout comme le Code Napoléon, n'accorde qu'une importance 
mineure au concept de patrimoine, l'auteur complète son analyse historique 
pour critiquer ensuite le Projet de Code civil qui prétend corriger certaines 
distorsions apportées au concept original de patrimoine. En effet, l'œuvre de 
l'Office de révision, ainsi que le souligne l'auteur, n'est pas elle-même 
dépourvue d'ambiguïté. 
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Car, pour rendre à chacun le sien, il faut que 
chacun puisse avoir quelque chose. 
PORTALIS 
Introduction 
This research is evoked by the challenge blazoned across Quebec's draft 
code by its project director: 
On a souvent dit du Code civil qu'il était un code de propriétaires et de rentiers, 
davantage préoccupé de la protection du patrimoine/"property" que du 
respect des droits de la personne humaine. Aussi a-t-on voulu que la 
reconnaissance du rôle de la personne humaine, l'affirmation et la protection 
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de sa dignité fussent l'un des traits saillants du Projet. ... Les règles tradi-
tionnelles, issues d'une philosophie attachée davantage à la transmission du 
patrimoine dans la famille/"an inheritance" qu'à l'épanouissement de l'enfant, 
devaient disparaître.1 
This situates patrimony as a concern central to the civil law. Instead of a 
background concern, which the challenge insists it has been all along, the 
concept is now thematized in its centrality, although perhaps only to be 
dismissed or, as promised, reduced. Reduction of its force may, in fact, be 
accomplished in part by the new attention given to it, on the principle that 
only when drained of pulsating intimacy with the vital events it inseparably 
enveined can a cultural phenomenon become the mummified object of awed 
regard : the principle of the "rearview mirror" in McLuhan. "The Owl of 
Minerva sets flights only in the gathering dusk", in Hegel's preface to his 
legal philosophy. 
The core meaning of patrimony is, however, polemical. It acquires its 
centrality at law only at the expense of personality in law. Patrimony appears 
as the competitor of the human person for attention, for "protection". It is 
not self-evident that this is the only way to propel patrimony onto 
centrestage. Certainly it was not so for classical theory, according to which 
patrimony is an emanation of personality. For it now to attract attention in 
this stance demands some explanation. 
One likely explanation is that the person is characterized by rights while 
patrimony is cast under property. Property appears as things non-human, 
rights appear as attributes of the person. How property, the consummate 
real right, should have so developed is no clearer than how rights should 
have appeared as the rubric for the appreciation of persons. This, too, needs 
explanation. 
Of course, person is priceless while things are venal. But many of the 
relations in which things stand to persons are as struck with the public order 
which is partly the criterion for persons themselves. And it is difficult to take 
seriously the assertion that our personal uniqueness, our indivisibility in 
space and time, belongs in a category of reality which lacks pecuniary value 
and is thus extra-patrimonial, extra commercium, hors commerce. For 
indivisibility (read: universality) is the very feature which characterizes 
patrimony in classical theory. Yet more ironic, what elicits the declaration of 
pricelessness is the brutal fact that the human person has a price indeed, is 
very much of interest to "commerce", and finds more willing buyers than 
any commodity. Priceless he is ; but only in the sense that other highly priced 
1. OFFICE DE RÉVISION DU CODE CIVIL/CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, Rapport sur le Code civil, 
du Québec/Report on the Quebec Civil Code, I, Projet de Code civil/Draft Civil Code, 
preface by P.-A. CRÉPEAU, Québec, Éditeur officiel, 1977, p. xxxi. 
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treasures are. Legal extrapatrimoniality cannot be based on the natural fact 
of pricelessness and non commerciality ; for that fact is a legal fact and at 
best the effect of extrapatrimoniality rather than its cause. We cannot 
simplify the problem by taking the person as better known, and then 
distinguishing patrimony from his extrapatrimoniality ; rather, we must still 
commence by characterizing patrimony, and thence raise any discussion of 
extrapatrimoniality. 
In characterizing patrimony, we are engaged in stipulative definition. 
The material to be researched is the use of a word. We know only that some 
claims have been made by the word about some idea and perhaps about 
some existing susbtance or attribute it is used to mean. We do not start with 
grounds tor taking any one position upon what that idea or existent is, so 
that we could perceive it even under a different symbol. Instead, this research 
is bound into the search for the textual uses of the term in civil law. The 
points of research are those four codifications of greater relevance to 
contemporary Quebec: the Quebec Draft Civil Code of 1977, the Civil Code 
of Quebec of 1866, the French Code civil of 1804, and the Roman Corpus 
Iuris Civilis of 529. Primary research is performed upon each legislative text 
for its use of the relevant term "patnmony-patrimoine-patrimonium". 
Secondary research consists in locating uses of the term in the major pieces 
of doctrine both subsequent and just prior to codification. This secondary 
research is unmanageably large, so selections must depend upon tertiary 
research which indicates where the crucial discussions are to be found, as 
well as what additional categories may further enlighten the first two phases. 
The most persistent categories are property (as a right, as a real right), things 
and goods (as property, as its object), and universality. This tertiary research 
is most frequently happenstance. For commentators upon the few legislative 
occurrences of the terms seldom gloss patrimony as such ; the systematic 
works repeat each others' remarks when attending to patrimony at all ; and 
contemporary indexers ignore it. 
The order of research is from past to present, assuming no less 
intelligibility to distant patrimony than to a present patrimony we understand 
no better. To locate alternatives in horizontal comparative law, next, a scan 
is made of cognate categories in non-civilian law, as well as the bases and 
evolution of the category in civilian laws not of the French group. But most 
scope will be given to the explicit critiques by recent French authors. Finally 
a suggestion will be made of what implicit underpinning is required for the 
doctrine of patrimony explicit in the draft code. Its coherence will be 
evaluated. 
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1. Corpus iuris civilis 
No effort will be made in this phase to isolate legislation from doctrine, 
since only one reference will be made to the Novellae which, if anything, 
would deserve such a title, and none to Justinian's Institutiones which might 
also be so called. Most of the references are to the collected doctrine of the 
Digesta plus an exposition of part of Gaius' earlier Institutiones. Only the 
later discussion of one contemporary doctrinal source countering Savigny's 
view of Roman law falls into the modern categorization. 
The strategy here will be to locate the uses of Patrimonium in Roman law 
and, secondly, those of bona which authors agree is where any correlative 
doctrine should be sought. In both, the research will seek some sense of 
universality, its meaning, sources and effects. Separate attention will be 
given to the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal ; the features of 
succession, including separation, continuation of person, and responsibility 
for debts ; and distinctions between types of goods, particularly the distinction 
between moveables and immoveables and its impact upon the unifying 
tendencies in private international law. 
1.1. Patrimonium 
The overcapping use of the phrase in Gaius' second book, "de rebus 
singulis et de rerum universitatibus", is in the first article: "... modo 
videamus de rebus ; quae vel in nostro patrimonio sunt vel extra nostrum 
Patrimonium habentur"2. The most likely meaning is taken from the article 
immediately following, which uses the same reference to a summa divisio and 
identifies the classes as things of divine right and things of human right. It 
would be natural to read these as the extrapatrimonial and patrimonial 
things, respectively ; but Gaius does not help by explicitly equating them. On 
the other hand, Foote's commentary is puzzling: 
The phrases in nostro patrimonio and extra nostrum Patrimonium, #1, are 
apparently equivalent to alicujus in bonis and nullius in bonis, #9, and to the 
expressions we meet elsewhere, in commercio and extra commercium.3 
His first equivalence is merely accidental, not essential ; for res derelictae 
may always be reduced into someone's possession. And the second meaning 
reflects back onto the divine and human rights, rather than onto the 
pecuniary and the non-pecuniary. Overall, there is no enlightenment here for 
the contemporary distinction of extra — and intrapatrimonial rights, nor 
any hint of a universality. 
2. Gaii Institutiones or Institutes of Roma Law by Gaius, tr. and comm. by Edward POSTE, 4th 
ed. rev. by E.A. WHITLOCK, Oxford, Clarendon, 1904, p. 123, II, 1. 
3. Id., p. 127. 
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In the other sources for the code given by Dirksen, only the third 
meaning of four shows any universality, but there is no hint of its source4. 
After he locates as its synonym bona and equates it to familia, as will be seen 
later, Patrimonium is opposed to persona, personale ; but again there is not 
the slightest resemblance between the meaning of this opposition and that of 
the modern. For both "praedia quae nostri patrimonii sunt" (landed estates) 
and "vectigalia, vel superficiaria" (personal income) which are not in our 
patrimony are opposed to the abstract modern person of the Willenstheorie. 
The same might be said for the two sides of "quae in patrimonio habet" and 
"quae in nominibus sunt". 
Somewhat more fruitful, universality appears in the cognate uses of the 
term in this third sense. To speak of a corpus patrimonii gives it considerable 
unity, but no indication of its source. And Gaius' own phrase, totum 
Patrimonium, is used not to unify it as such but only to differentiate one 
quantity of it from another quantity of it, viz., a dodrantem totiuspatrimonii, 
three-quarters. 
The doctrine in the Digest itself is of little more help. As summarized, 
the patrimony is the goods received from father or mother, governed by the 
will of the paterfamilias, and including what we can keep or recover. The 
slave has none ; the woman exceeding hers has a right of restitution, even 
though all are presumed to know the extent of their own patrimonies. Even a 
hopeful reference to the "glosse sur le mot Patrimonium"5 turns out to be no 
more than a statement of the principle that patrimony is determined only 
upon the execution of debts. While, further, the right to keep or recover 
(persequendi retinendique) is known by the name ius patrimonii, implying a 
right over a single object (Ulpian, 275, 17), its unity is too ambiguous to 
stand upon. For one can say both that Patrimonium est compositum (Julian, 
764,25) ant that "unius duo patrimonia non videntur" (Papinian, 790, 37) ; 
that is, one can both establish and obliterate its unity by texts6. Even the 
cognate quote from Julian that "hereditas nihil aliud est quas successio in 
Universum jus" must have its crucial term criticized as an interpolation of 
later Romanists7. 
4. H.E. DIRKSEN, "Patrimonium", in Manuale Lalinitatis Fontium Iuris Civilis Romanorum, 
Berlin, Duncker u. Humbolt, 1837, p. 687: 1. Bona a parentibus profecta; 2. Fundus 
hereditarius ; 3. Substantia bonorum nostrorum : 4. Corpus rerum fiscalium, item rerum 
Principis tarn privatarum quam patrimonialium. 
5. D.4.4.9.1, in La Clef des Lois romaines ou Dictionnaire analytique et raisonné de toutes les 
matières contenues dans le Corps de droit, II, Metz, C. Lamort, 1810, p. 231. 
6. Vocabularium Jurisprudentiae Romanae, IV, éd. B. KUEBLER, Berlin, W. DeGruyter, 1936, 
p. 554. 
7. F.H. SPETH, La divisibilité du patrimoine et l'entreprise d'une personne, Paris, Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1957, no. 45, p. 42, n. 3, from D.50.16.62. 
C.B. GRAY Patrimony 87 
Nonetheless, commentators regularly see the peculium as built upon the 
model of the Patrimonium of which it was part. It has a universality because 
it is a liability limited to its assets ; so, when its universality is seen to model 
that of patrimony, this identifies what the universality of patrimony is 
understood as, also. The peculium is a mass of goods entrusted by master to 
slave, or father to son, with which the slave could transact business for the 
master, business whose liability was limited to the value of those goods, 
except for creditors' suit, also, in rem versum or upon fruits turned back to 
the master8. This is "a legal universality, separated from his own, but of 
which he is owner"9. Within the general monies held by the slave for his 
master, further, there was also the merx or that portion of the peculium 
devoted to particular enterprise with its liabilities limited from spilling over 
upon the rest of the peculium. The merx within the peculium within the 
Patrimonium is seen by Speth as a separate patrimony within a separate 
patrimony from the residual patrimony. The cogent feature is that the unity 
of each has the very same source: limited liability. 
1.2. Bona 
Speth argues the same universality for bona. Citing passages from the 
Digest some of which include debts within bona, some of which identify 
bona only as the balance after debts have been subtracted, he asserts that 
both imply an intimate link of assets and liabilities ; and concludes that their 
universality is known to the Romans because they have "le concept de 
l'universalité qui résulte de la combinaison de ces éléments" 10. 
Villey argues for a different source of universality in the patrimony, 
which he locates in the inconvenience of treating the deceased's valuables 
separately rather than passing them en bloc. Such an ensemble of goods can 
be perceived even from the time of the Twelve Tables, when it is called the 
familia pecuniaque, familia being the res mancipi or more valuable because 
they can pass only by mancipatio (slaves, animals, maybe land), and pecunia 
being the res nee mancipi (money, flocks) ". This ensemble is made up of 
corporeal goods only ; their unity corresponds to their nature. They form a 
8. Gu. CARDASCIA and J. IMBERT, Histoire des institutions et des faits sociaux, Paris, 
Monchrestien, 1955, pp. 396-397. 
9. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 7, p. 45, no. 47. 
10. Id., p. 43, no. 45. He reproduces these : "Bona autem hic, ut plerumque solemus dicere, ita 
accipienda sunt universitatis cuiusque successionem, qua succeditur in ius demortui 
suscipiturque eius rei commodum et incommodum..." (D.37,1.3); "Bonorum appellatio, 
sicut hereditatis, universitatem quandam ac ius successionis et non singulares res 
demonstrat." (D.50.16.208) 
11. Pecus sets the structure of pecunia and in turn peculium. 
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unity as does a flock of sheep, a corpus ex distantibus as the Stoics called it, 
"chose unique formée de parties distantes" 12. 
1.2.1. Incorporeals 
But the catalogue of things could be expanded, and accordingly its 
kinds of unity. Before Cicero, only the concrete dominus was known of — 
things changed owners ; it was not the ownership that was changed. Cicero 
introduced the Greek Stoic distinction between things seen and touched, and 
things conceived by the spirit ; and dominium becomes a reality. Seneca gives 
these the names of corporeal things and incorporeal things. This is the name 
and distinction repeated by Gaius 13. He exemplifies incorporeal things by 
inheritance, usufruct and obligation, and later on by property; although the 
things to which they relate or bind us are corporeal, the jus in each example 
is not itself corporeal. 
This abstraction makes possible, and perhaps necessary, the tighter 
unfication of goods. Once an abstraction, it could contain abstractions, viz., 
credit claims and debts ; this could be sought as a single object by hereditatis 
petitio, and could be transmitted by a single act, a universitas given by 
universal title as particular things are given by particular title. Gaius' 
dominium is not only the quality of a dominus but one of his objects of 
exercise ; proprietas is not only the corporeal thing upon which the exercise 
bears, but is an incorporeal itself subject to that exercise u . 
Foote's commentary to Gaius is characteristically critical of such a 
move, but goes beyond the simple observation that the same object is made 
at once something corporeal and something incorporeal — which is not the 
case, for there is just the analogous use of the single term bona, instead of an 
equiv on any particular bonum. Foote notes in addition that "the secondary 
object of a right, however, is not always a body... Other rights, apparently, 
have no determinate object, corporeal or incorporeal" 15. This is an effective 
criticism ot the analogy where no bona appear as objects of rights ; the 
criticism is less cogent where the object of right is not absent. The 
conclusion, then, that dominium and proprietas are incorporeal exclusively, 
and never corporeal, seems less well supported16. 
12. M. VILLEY, Le droit romain, Paris, P.U.F., 1964, p. 75 ; F.H. SPETH, supra, note 7, p. 42, 
no. 45. 
13. Bk.II, a.13. 
14. VILLEY, supra, note 12, p. 76, and n.l. 
15. In Gaius, supra, note 2, p. 125. 
16. It is precisely this point, at the root of patrimony, which the Quebec draft code rejects. 
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Upon these considerations depends the status of real rights, and their 
dismemberment's open or closed list. If property is an "abstraction", that is, 
the name of a right rather than a natural thing, it can extend over both 
natural things as well as over rights themselves, including itself and 
especially including the ensemble of rights in the patrimony to which it 
belongs. Patrimony can be unified by reason of its elements all being subject 
to the same right, whether the property (of corporeal goods) or (property of) 
personal credits17. A further result, stressed by Ginossar18, is that those 
rights which seem to be dismemberments of property become instead objects 
of property ; the property upon corporeal goods is not, then, split but instead 
is one exercise of property while its exercise upon the "dismemberments" is 
another, with the special features which procedurally attach to "real rights". 
One can dispense with their reality, while finding patrimonial unity in the 
right of property, a right no longer set off against personal existence19. 
1.2.2. Successions 
Bona is the term by which successions is treated, as well. There is no use 
of the term Patrimonium in this context, even in an area now institutionalized 
as "separation of patrimonies". As will be seen true for the Ancien droit, 
Roman law too used only the expression separatio bonorum which predo-
minates even in the French Code civil and the presentations thereof; only the 
ninteenth century commentators bring the current term into wide use, by 
reason of the philosophical influences to be canvassed. Barafort, who 
17. This is punctuated to leave outside parentheses the terms which would have been 
considered to name rights, apart from a property in their incorporeality. 
18. S. GINOSSAR, Droit réel, propriété et créance; élaboration d'un système des droits 
patrimoniaux, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1960, p. 137, no. 50, 
n.240 ; F.H. SPETH, supra, note 7, p. 44, no. 45, n.l, hints at the same solution, viz., that 
goods have the sense also of rights which are social products that can also be property, 
when he expresses regrets at the loss of the text at D.50.16.49, in which Ulpian explains the 
sense of "civil goods" following his extant explanation of "natural goods", the passage to 
which Zachariae and Aubry and Rau appeal, commencing: "Bonorum appellatio aut 
naturalis aut civilis est, naturaliter bona ex eo dicuntur, quod beant, hoc est beatos 
faciunt : beare est prodesse. In bonis autem nostris computari sciendum est non solum, 
quae dominii nostri sunt, sed et si bona fide a nobis possideantur vel superficiaria sint. 
Aeque bonis adnumerabitur etiam, si quid est in actionibus, petitionibus, persucutionibus : 
nam haec omnia in bonis esse videntur." 
19. Ginossar finds that the counterpart to personalized real rights, viz., obligation resting 
upon real property rather than upon persons, is present in the words of Roman law, supra, 
note 18, p. 95, no. 37: "Labeo autem hanc servitutem non hominem debere sed rem" 
(D.8.5.6. #2, on servitude); "Si debitor res suas duobus simul pignori obligaverit..." 
(D.20.1.10, on pledge); "... priori domino vel creditori, qui nomine hypothecae rem 
obligatam habuit..." (C.7.39.8, on hypothec). 
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collects the Roman sources, concludes that in Roman law this is une voie 
d'exécution open to all creditors at once, while in the French code it is a 
privilege of creditors and available only singly20. That is, the institutiona-
lizing of this category procèdes apace with that of the other, viz., of 
patrimony. 
The goods which pass, separated or not, have not at first such striking 
unity in themselves, because it is not needed. For they are unified not in 
themselves but by attachment to the person of their owner. But the 
attachment to person is completely other than that to be seen in the 
nineteenth century's person made out of will. The person is still one whose 
unity is moral, but his morality is not voluntarist. The crisis with which 
death faced ce peuple, avide d'immortalité as Treilhard called the Romans is 
identified by Fustel de Coulanges : "l'homme meurt, le culte reste, le foyer ne 
doit pas s'étendre ni le tombeau être abandonné. Avec le culte subsiste la 
fortune qui en est inséparable, immobile comme le foyer et le tombeau 
auxquels elle est attachée"21. While primitive coproperty was a favourite 
thesis of socialist reformers to explain why an heir succeeded, the hypothesis 
is unhistorical. Instead, the person must be replaced in the performance of 
the sacra privata; this power and duty is what is transferred22, and the 
inheritance of goods is only its external manifestation. In fact, according to 
Blondel's study23, originally only extrapatrimonial rights as they would be 
known today make up the primitive succession, in the manner still visible in 
dynastic succession. Only late did primitive Roman law allow transmission 
of goods by succession, and only later still their transmission inter vivos24. 
The heir's inability to refuse is one side of the policy of ensuring a successor, 
the testamentary freedom is the other. To prove further that succession is 
"de nature morale avant d'être de nature patrimoniale", Blondel supplies 
texts to show that in areas under customary law with a heavy dose of truly 
Roman law the reserve is not an alimentary duty but rests on the policy idea 
of a family duty. This shows a succession not reducible to something 
material25. Armand carries further the argument by noting that in Roman 
20. M.F. BARAFORT, Traité théorique et pratique de la séparation des patrimoines, Paris, 
Durand, 1866, pp. 11-12, no. 6. Contrast the Quebec draft, which follows Rome. 
21. La cité antique, forenote to J. ARMAND, Successeurs universels et successeurs particuliers, 
Paris, Bonvalot-Jouve, 1906. 
22. Id., p. 58: "hereditas nihil aliud est quam successio in Universum jus quod defunctus 
habuerit" (D.50.16.62; but see supra, n.228); "ejiusdem juris et potestatis cujus et 
defunctus fuit" (D.50.16.24; D.50,17,59; D.29.2.37). 
23. P. BLONDEL, La transmission à cause de mort des droits extrapatrimoniaux et des droits 
patrimoniaux à caractère personnel, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1969, p. 4, n. 4. 
24. Id., p. 5, n.5. 
25. While in the "Romanist" law of the pays de droit écrit, that is, the glossators' law, the 
legitime is an alimentary duty or of a patrimonial nature, against the impoverishing policy 
of testamentary freedom: id., p. 17, no. 20. 
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law there is no such institution as succession à titre universel, general 
succession26. One succeeds to the person, or succeeds not at all. Instead of 
being measured as so much of a successor by the quantity of goods he 
receives, the successor is so by reference to the person he succeeds, and some 
aliquot part of his goods — all or some — comes to the successor ; sustinent 
personam defuncti. Thus aliquot heirs bear full liability ultra vires successionis, 
too27. The particular legatee receives instead a gift, by reference to the item 
and not the person; his liability is limited accordingly28. 
Despite Armand's expression of these results in nineteenth century 
prose, that "les volontés du testateur et de l'héritier, consécutives l'une à 
l'autre, se touchent et se lient"29, their result is to show a succession 
universalized not by attachment to private personhood, but by attachment 
to the public glory in the person of the benefactor. The problems, inherent in 
the classical French doctrine, of how external goods in patrimony could be 
an emanation from the internal isolate of will, cannot arise. 
The only other sense of successoral universality is irrelevant to these 
purposes. This is "the ways in which things are acquired as a universality/ 
quibus modis per universitatem res adquirantur". Such a universitas comes 
either by testamentary or intestate succession, purchase of an insolvent's 
estate, adoption of a person who is sui juris, or marriage in manum ; in all of 
these the person cared for has his whole property transferred to the other in 
an aggregate mass30. But as Gaius points out in the preceding article, this 
has nothing to do with the character of the goods, or of the person ; it is just 
procedural, how to transfer rights altogether instead of singly. Nor is the 
universality of goods formed because it is the property of a universitas or 
group of persons any more in issue here31. 
In a universality by control, the objects lose their identity and become 
fungible. The impetus is given, then, to reduce all distinctions based upon the 
26. Supra, note 21, p. 16. 
27. Armand, p. 57, locates the origin of the notion of succession by general title as distinct 
from universal title in the loi de ventôse an XII, whose purpose was to restrict the right of 
seisin to successors of the universality solely; also p. 16. The need to do this he finds, in 
turn, in an error of Pothier who understood le mort saisit le vif to mean that claim not only 
to possession but also to property was given, involving thus a crushing burden upon heirs 
to pay debts beyond their legacy's value. This the Revolutionary authors wished to escape. 
28. The obligation to pay upon the particular legacies should not be confused with the 
obligation to pay out the particular legacies. The first would fall upon the legatees, the 
latter upon the universal heir. That is, instead of the particular legatees being seized of 
their bequests directly, the heir serves as trustee for them, in the procedure described by 
Gaius, II, 102, which he says has become the only procedure in use, II, 103. 
29. Supra, note 21, p. 60. 
30. Supra, note 2, II, 97. 
31. Id., II, 11. 
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types of goods ; the French codifiers reject the materna and paterna, the 
Quebec commissioners reject the same distinction and base their rejection in 
part upon the law of Novella 118, to be seen. But that law looks to quite 
different considerations than the maintenance of fungible universality. The 
sole consideration to which the official preface to the law looks is the 
"unfittingness" of such a distinction, and perhaps the fact that the old 
distinctions are complexifying; nothing more is said: 
Plurimas et diversas leges veteribus temporibus prolatas invenientes, per quas 
non juste differentia [non juste discrepantia, in the draft version] ab intestato 
successionis inter cognatos ex masculis et femiriis introducta est, necessarium 
esse perspeximus omnes simul ab intestato cognationum successiones per 
praesentem legem clara compendiosaque divisione disponere...32 
1.2.3. Immoveables 
The other prominent division within goods in the patrimony, between 
moveables and immoveables, does not even appear in Gaius' divisions, and 
hardly appears elsewhere. But this division is largely equivalent to the 
distinction between the paternal and maternal goods, and the goods 
acquired by oneself, the propres and the acquets of a later era. The difficulty 
with the distinction where it did appear was the same as with the distinction 
between corporeal and incorporeal goods : once the property at the core of 
patrimony is seen as a right over both sides of the division, it makes as little 
sense to characterize that right as corporeal as to characterize it as 
immoveable or moveable, and even less when the former is identified with a 
real right. 
The absence of any need for the division at the start of this evolution in 
Rome is parallel at its end to Savigny's attachment of each good to the whole 
of patrimony, so as to treat all the same according to what he saw as l'idée du 
caractère incorporel et universel of Roman succession law33. But, in between, 
changing valuations of goods drives their legal control out of the law of 
situation when immoveables were wealth (with agricultural wealth and 
territorial fief) and into a law of domicile when moveables become wealth3". 
32. Corpus Iuris Civilis, 6th ed., v.3, Novellae, ed. R. SCHOEIL and W. KROLL, Berlin, 
1959, p. 567 ; my emphasis. 
33. F. BOULANGER, Etude comparative du droit international privé des successions en France et 
en Allemagne, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1964, p. 31, no. 32. 
34. Id., pp. 30 to 40. This is reflected in the difference between article 334 of the Coutume de 
Paris charging of debts upon all goods without distinction, and the charging of debts 
primarily upon acquets (mostly moveables) and only secondarily upon propres, (mostly 
immoveables) in article 400 of the Coutume de Normandie, according to BOULANGER, p. 36, 
n.372. The latter was the primary influence on Quebec law until the Quebec Act: 
A. MAYRAND, "Ladévolution successorale ab intestat endroit québécois", (1972) Rev. jur. 
et pol. Ind. et coop. 887, passim. 
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While this contribution to the unity of patrimony proceeded apace in both 
France and Germany, the unification in France was more thoroughgoing. 
For though the Prussian Code of 1794 set personal capacity under the law of 
domicile (art. 23) while placing both moveables and immoveables under the 
law of their situation (arts 28, 32), the French Code of 1804 in following this 
located the law of domicile in the national law, in effect the law of 
situation35. The subsequent theoretical patrimonialization of French law 
easily suggested that its unity of treatment for moveables and immoveables 
could be shown to be derived from the Roman law because of the latter's 
lack of such a distinction, too. The difference between an absence of 
distinction and an affirmative exclusion of it was given as little importance, if 
even recognized, as was the totally different Roman conception of ius from 
the classical patrimonial theorists. 
1.3. lus 
Modern patrimony is spoken of in terms of rights ; it is the ensemble of 
rights incorporeal rather than of goods corporeal. The assembling is possible 
because rights are related to the single isolated will ; they are its powers. In 
the Roman law of Savigny, this right is a quality of the subject, one of his 
faculties or powers ; it is defined by its own content, the object it stands faced 
with for control by it. It is unilateral, a matter of fact about the subject of 
rights36. 
The repeated argument of the jurisprudent Michel Villey has been that 
this is not what ius meant in Roman law, not even when put into the plural 
iura and given a genitive object, e.g., ius disponendi37. A faculty or power is a 
pre-legal fact ; "la puissance absolue qu'exerce le maître romain sur sa chose, 
ce n'est point le droit, c'est le silence, ce sont les lacunes du droit", "en 
dehors de la cité, en dehors du droit, dans une autre sphère de la vie"38. For 
Ulpian as for Aristotle and Aquinas, says Villey, ius is instead "cela qui est 
juste (id quod justum est), le résultat auquel tend le travail du juriste : le juste 
rapport objectif, la juste proportion découverte entre les pouvoirs", 
35. Allgemeines Landrecht fuer Preussischen Staaten, 1794, served as model for the Code civil, 
1804; B. NOLDE, La codification du Droit international public, Paris, extrait du Cours de 
l'Académie du droit international de LaHaye, 1936, showed that the ministère de la Justice 
ordered it translated in 1801, and that the preliminary schema of the code followed it: 
F. BOULANGER, supra, note 33, p. 38, no. 40. 
36. M. VILLEY, "La genèse du droit subjectif chez Guillaume d'Ockham", (1964) 9 A.P.D. 97, 
p. 101. 
37. As Armand following Villey closely here remarks, the stress is upon the object in the 
gerundive, not upon the noun: supra, note 21, p. 182. 
38. M. VILLEY, supra, note 36, pp. 107, 108. 
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"appliqué à l'individu,... la part qui lui revient dans ce juste partage", "son 
statut, sa condition particulière,... ou telle chose, tel bien, telle valeur en tant 
qu'ils constituent sa part"39. lus dominii, rather than the tautology it might 
now seem, was instead a contradiction in terms. lus créditons is not his 
power, but is the obligation or vinculum iuris itself, "le rapport liant 
objectivement le créancier et le débiteur"40. No other notion is to be found in 
Roman law nor in canon law, nor in medieval thought. With William of 
Ockham or the Franciscan school of voluntarism more generally, the 
dispute over voluntary poverty is resolved for the friars on their claim that 
they bear a ius poli to use goods in fact, without having to bear a iusfori to 
sue for them41. A right of property based on use, such as Locke developed, 
finds in the former inherent power or faculty its perfect conceptualization 
legally42. 
What appears unmistakably is not only that Villey's conceptualization 
of Roman ius stands at the far pole from Savigny's conception of Roman ius, 
but also that a centering of a unity of rights in patrimony around the person 
and his will is meaningless upon Villey's view. If it is correct — and Villey is 
as suspiciously lavish with his accusation of the egoism and disordered 
appetite attendant upon droit subjectif as is Savigny's voluntarist fixation, 
for one to be confident of his own objectivity — then one may look 
elsewhere than in Roman law for anything to do with classical patrimonial 
theory. A rejection of the latter, in turn, would require either an acceptance 
of Roman droit objectif simply, or else an alternative foundation to the legal 
relevance of droits subjectifs. One way to pose the issue is to ask whether 
there is any way to make rights (and so patrimony) concrete, without making 
them individual, factual and extra-legal; and any way to make them 
relational, without making them therewith abstract. 
39. Id, p. 103. 
40. Id, p. 106. 
41. Id., p. 118. 
42. Villey's thesis is not without critics. Several Franciscan thinkers, as well as the thomist 
Heinrich Rommen — whose views Villey rejects in turn, id., p. I l l , n.l — have noted 
various flaws even while agreeing overall with Villey's characterization of Roman ius. See : 
ROMMEN, "The Geneology of Natural Rights", (1954) 8 Thought 403. For example, 
Aquinas also held views on subjective rights ; only early Roman law held dominium outside 
the city; subjective rights emerge as a practical claim in the free cities long before 
Ockham's fourteenth century systematization, as well as in the glossators ; his theory is in 
a polemical and political context, against a Pope adverse to his vow of poverty, and is not 
related to his voluntarism — not to mention the rejection of that latter characterization 
itself. 
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2. Code Napoléon 
2.1. Legislation 
As in the Quebec code, the term patrimoine is never defined in the 
French Code civil, although many terms are, and is rarely used. Only three 
present uses are found43, and one since abrogated44. 
2.2. Doctrine 
These articles which mention patrimony would not be likely to ground 
any theory, even though one might be provoked to ask what it means there 
and whence it comes, that is, what ideology it imports into that objective 
ideality that is the code by its very presence there. But given the fact to be 
reviewed shortly of a grand structure of explanation erected over patrimoine, 
authors subsequent to the codifiers and to the builders have tried to explain 
its origin in the code. Speth is perhaps the most forthright45 : the classical 
theory is supported by articles 732 C.N. and 2092-4 C.N.46. He points to 
43. Code civil, 77e éd., Paris, Jurisprudence générale Dalloz, 1977-78 (as "C.N."): Art. 878 
C.N. Ils peuvent demander dans tous les cas, et contre tout créancier, la séparation du 
patrimoine du défunt d'avec le patrimoine de l'héritier. 
Art. 881 C.N. Les créanciers de l'héritier ne sont point admis à demander la séparation des 
patrimoines contre les créanciers de la succession. 
Art. 963 C.N. Les biens compris dans la donation révoquée de plein droit rentreront dans 
le patrimoine du donateur, libre de toutes charges et hypothèques du chef du donataire... 
[Such a situation arises as in art. 960 C.N. upon the birth of later children. Compare the 
expression apparently equivalent to dans le patrimoine du donateur that is found in the 
parallel article 954 C.N. regarding revocation for reason of ingratitude : dans les mains du 
donateur.] 
44. Codes annotés. Nouveau Code civil, IV, Paris, Jurisprudence générale Dalloz, 1909; 
am. 1957, to a version with a different limitation and without the word. 
Art. 2111 C.N. Les créanciers et légataires qui demandent la séparation du patrimoine du 
défunt, conformément à l'article 878 du titre des Successions, conservent, à l'égard des 
créanciers des héritiers ou représentants du défunt, leur privilège sur les immeubles de la 
succession, par les inscriptions faites sur chacun de ses biens, dans le six mois à compter de 
l'ouverture de la succession... 
45. F.H. SPETH, La divisibilité du patrimoine et l'entreprise d'une personne, Paris, Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1957. 
46. Art. 732 C.N. La loi ne considère ni la nature ni le régime des biens, pour en régler la 
succession. 
Art. 2092 C.N. Quiconque s'est obligé personnellement est tenu de remplir ses engagements 
sur tous ses biens mobiliers et immobiliers présents et à venir. 
Art. 2093 C.N. Les biens du débiteur sont le gage commun de ses créanciers, et le prix s'en 
distribue entre eux par contribution, à moins qu'il n'y ait entre les créanciers des causes 
légitimes de préférence. 
Art. 2094 C.N. Les causes légitimes de préférence sont les privilèges et hypothèques. 
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places other than explicit patrimonial separations where the authors of the 
code also clearly envisaged an institution such as patrimony as an integral 
part of the legal system47 : in life, the explicit administration of others' goods 
as a whole for them (tutorship, interdiction, spouses, absentees, gestion 
d'affaires), and the resulting implicit administration of the totality of one's 
own goods ; and, in death, the curatorship of vacant successions, and the 
ability to dispose of the goods as a universality. 
2.2.1. Codifiers and Intermediary Law 
The institution of separation of patrimonies did not appear at all on the 
first relevant opportunity of the new order, viz., the law of 9 messidor an III 
which organized a system of hypothecs. Only in a replacement section of the 
law of 11 brumaire and VIII was la distinction et la séparation des patrimoines 
carefully saved from any other regulations on the effect of privileges and 
hypothecs48. The motives and spirit of the civil code's separation of 
patrimonies — the sole codai mention of patrimony, recall — appear in 
Simeon's presentation of 29 germinal an XI : he skips the matter entirely ! 
Having proceded in his discourse up to what now is article 877 C.N., he next 
treats of articles 883 onwards, never returning to his omission of articles 
878-881 dealing with separations49. No other treatment of this issue has 
been located except for the brief reference by Portalis on 20 ventôse an XI in 
his "Exposé des motifs relatifs au titre De la propriété" : 
Loin que la division des patrimoines ait pu détruire la justice et la morale, c'est 
au contraire la propriété, reconnue et constituée par cette division, qui a 
développé et affirmé les premières règles de la morale et de la justice. Car, pour 
rendre à chacun le sien, il faut que chacun puisse avoir quelque chose.50 
As for the indistinction of goods in article 732 C.N., which is supposed to be 
one implicit locus classicus for the theory of patrimony, Treilhard stated the 
preoccupations of the legislator to the Corps législatif51 : in paraphrase, 
under the Old Law the desire to preserve family possessions — praiseworthy 
47. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 45, p. 110, no. 127. 
48. M.F. BARAFORT, Traité théorique et pratique de la séparation des patrimoines, Paris, 
Durand, 1866, pp. 16-17. 
49. Discours prononcé devant le Corps législatif, in P.A. FENET (éd.), Recueil complet des 
travaux préparatoires du Code civil, XII, Paris, 1827 p. 
50. Code civil français, IV, Paris, Firmin Didot, XII (1804), p. 29; Speth's reference to a 
presentation by Treilhard on the matter of separations was not found, at large nor at the 
references cited to : 23 nivose an XI, Procès-verbal du Conseil d'État, séance du 23 nivôse 
an XI, V, no. 28 ; Exposé de motifs, IX, no. 35. 
51. B. DE LOCRÉ, La législation civile, commerciale et criminelle de la France, X, Paris, Treuttel 
and Wuertz, 1827, pp. 183-185. 
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if kept within balance — made inalienable the biens propres, i.e., immoveables 
received by succession. The results were: (1) uncertainty, harmful both the 
private interest since an innocent acquirer could find his acquisition 
withdrawn, and to public interest because this roused much litigation; 
(2) contrary to the presumed will of the intestate, whose immediate family 
would be stripped for the sake of distant relatives, perhaps unknown ; and 
(3) not according to natural law, for distinction by origin is artificial. 
Instead, "on voulait surtout dans les lois cette unité qui semble être leur 
essence, puisqu'elles sont l'image de l'ordre éternel". The unity which 
counters l'anarchie féodale and its maximes funestes et antisociales is, first, 
that the efforts of the fathers not be lost upon their children — although this 
would seem rather to argue for maintenance of the Old Law's free acquets 
but bound propres — and, much more to the lurking nerve of the reform, 
that there be no resultant stifling of "le principe le plus pur et le plus actif 
d'une louable émulation". Competition underlies fathers' love, it seems ; this 
is the natural unity, image of the eternal, which makes foods fungible and 
serves as "le vœu de tous les hommes éclairés". 
Still, even this much suggestion of purposeful creation of patrimonial 
unity probably goes too far. More likely is just the economic fact that such 
distinctions are outmoded. Rather than expunged, they are just abandoned52. 
Il fut un temps où les immeubles formaient la portion la plus précieuse du 
patrimoine des citoyens... On n'a pas dû attacher autant d'importance à une 
portion de terre, autrefois patrimoine impose [sic] des citoyens, et qui, 
aujourd'hui, ne forme peut-être pas la moitié de leur fortune. 
As for the alternative pedestal of the theory of patrimony, the common 
pledge of articles 2092 C.N. ff., its brief explanation is similar, and similarly 
not in terms of patrimony53. 
La conséquence de ce principe est que le crédit de celui qui contracte un 
engagement se compose non seulement de ses immeubles, non seulement de ses 
biens actuels, mais encore de ceux que sa bonne conduite, que son industrie, 
que l'ordre naturel des successions peuvent lui faire espérer. 
Speth finds here not an allusion to the institution of a cohesive patrimony, 
but only an intention to exclude the arbitrary withdrawal of some types of 
goods54. That is, instead of pointing to the uniqueness of patrimony as a 
common pledge as against the multiplicity of creditors, what is stressed is the 
additive character of their pledge: every new item acquired feeds into them. 
The stress is on biens as choses, not as droits. 
52. TREILHARD, "Présentation du titre De la distinction des biens", 20 vendémaire an XII, in 
P.A. FENET, (ed.), supra, note 49, XI, p. 34. N.B. fortune for patrimoine. 
53. B. DE LOCRÉ, supra, note 51, XVI, Bruxelles, 1836, p. 108. 
54. Supra, note 45, p. 118, no. 132. 
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Expanding the openness of goods' disposition at one point, the codifiers 
contract is elsewhere. From Treilhard alone, it is alleged55, arises the 
numerus clausus of real rights : "Il ne peut exister aucune autre espèce de 
droits". Again, the ending of the different treatment for different types of 
goods is identified by Blondel as Roman in its organization but not Roman 
in its foundation, i.e., not being utterly individualistic. To show this he cites 
Bigot-Prémeneau : 
Il est difficile de convaincre celui qui est habitué à se regarder comme maître 
absolu de sa fortune, qu'il n'est pas dépouillé de son droit de propriété, 
lorsqu'on veut l'assujettir à des règles, soit sur la quantité des biens dont il 
entende disposer, soit sur les personnes qui sont l'objet de son affectation, soit 
sur les formes avec les quelles il manifeste sa volonté.56 
Roman indistinction is supposed chosen, then, only in order to win over the 
owners, while succession is really non-individualistic in the codifiers. Such is 
shown, says Blondel57, by Treilhard's explanation that "l'héritier que crée la 
volonté de l'homme ne le devient que par dérogation au droit commun". 
Only nineteenth century authors gave precedence to testamentary succession. 
That this shows, as Speth agrees58, the codifiers reacting only against 
complexity and not promoting individualistic will is doubtful. What is clear, 
however, is that this will is left in the pedestrian position of bourgeois 
competition, rather than being erected into the transcendent principle of a 
patrimony, as did the later nineteenth century writers. 
2.2.2. Ancien droit: Pothier 
Neither is patrimony in pre-Revolutionary French law a prominent 
feature. Speth notes that it attends not to patrimony, but the patrimonies. 
Among these he describes as an autonomous universality the fief; and 
discovers its cohesion in the special affectation of the goods, that is, they 
could bear debts only of the fief, making it a distinct entity. In turn, the 
disappearance of many and the rise of a single patrimony occurred through a 
change in the passif: payment en nature being shunted aside by the use of 
money, the single payment, so also was the need to keep multiple actifs 
instead of one59. 
55. S. GINOSSAR, supra, note 18, p. 182, no. 67, quoting from B. DE LOCRÉ, supra, note 51, VIII, 
p. 51. 
56. P. BLONDEL, La transmission à cause de mort des droits extrapatrimoniaux et des droits 
patrimoniaux à caractère personnel, Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1969, quoting from P.A. FENET (ed.), supra, note 49, XII, p. 509, at p. 18, no. 21-23. 
57. Id., p. 20, no. 25. 
58. Supra, note 45, p. 57, no. 64. 
59. Id., pp. 56-57, no. 63. 
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Similarly, Blondel explains the absence of a patrimony at death by the 
prominence of succession to person, not to goods. On the one hand, children 
continue parents and are bound by succession to personality, rather than to 
goods; rather than goods as a common pledge, liability is personal — "la 
première des aumônes est de payer ses dettes", quoting Saleilles. On the 
other hand, feudal land passes in such a way as to ensure the lord's territorial 
sovereignty — not to a foreign heir but to one who will be subject to the lord. 
Both are far from patrimonial succession60. 
Certainly the texts collected from Domat, Lebrun and Pothier by 
Barafort, upon what he calls "separation of patrimonies" neither make 
mention of the term nor hint at a concept of universality, speaking instead of 
séparation des biens61. 
Pothier does, however, speak in the context of property about a 
universality such as a succession. In order to recover this once possession is 
lost, one cannot use an action in revendication as upon particular items lost, 
but must use a petition for the inheritance. This is not true of all 
universalities, for there are some which can be revendicated as particulars, 
e.g., a flock of sheep, a brace of horses. "Il ne faut pas confondre avec 
l'universalité des biens, ce qui n'est qu'universalité de choses"62. The 
distinction of biens and choses is provocative, but never developed in this 
treatise nor in the preceding Traité des personnes et des choses. Nor are the 
concepts of universality here distinguished ; for despite the editor's footnote 
that this is one of the most important distinctions in law because of its 
practical consequences63, Pothier does not even use the concept or the term 
when he comes to treat of its appropriate action, the petition for inheritance, 
later on64. This is the only discussion of a universality which is owned, aside 
from the ordinary use of universel in the context of the whole or aliquot part 
of an inheritance65. 
Likewise, it is not possible to cue to the reference to will, for the demand 
that tradition, gain and loss of property be by will is an unspectacular 
insistence upon consensus66. What is worthy of note, however, is the 
exception to the demand for tradition. The reason why tradition is required 
in order to pass property is that tradition gives possession, which is essential 
60. Supra, note 56, p. 35, no. 42. 
61. Supra, note 48, no. 7, pp. 13-16. 
62. R.-J. POTHIER, Traité du droit de domaine de propriété (Mil), no. 283, in Œuvres, IX, 2e éd. 
par M. BUGNET, Paris, Pion, 1861, p. 200. 
63. Id., n.3. 
64. Id., no. 365, p. 234. 
65. Id., nos 248-250. 
66. Id., nos 231, 259-260, 265-266, respectively. 
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for ownership67 ; and possession means a physical detention68, of which 
incorporeals are incapable. Nonetheless, property— itself an incorporeal — 
does pass. As a first explanation, it is said that there is a quasi-possession 
given by use69 ; but so is there of the peculium of the slave, child or religious, 
which is not his property70. So as a second approach, Pothier cites Pufendorf 
in one of his few non-Roman references herein, to the effect that only when 
property is looked upon as physical and present power to make use is 
tradition indispensible. 
Mais lorsque le domaine de propriété d'une chose n'est considéré que comme 
une qualité purement morale, en vertu de la quelle une chose appartient à 
quelqu'un, rien n'empêche, dans les purs termes du droit naturel, que le 
domaine de propriété, considéré de cette manière, puisse passer d'une personne 
à une autre par une simple convention, avant qu'elle ait été suivi de la 
tradition." 
The hint this gives, which would escape attention, however, were such not 
focused comparatively, is carried out in the overall structure of study Pothier 
makes. Following Arnaud, one can find in Pothier the change of perspective 
from property as defined by its object to property as defined by our rights 
which, as will be seen, makes possible or even necessary the classical 
conception of patrimony72. Studying the final treatise added to Pothier's 
vast commentary on Roman law73, wherein he rearranges the rules of law 
from the order of Gaius' treatment which Pothier's Pandects had followed, 
Arnaud finds in its third part, Res, the Roman law transformed as did the 
Modern School of Natural Law, that is, the replacement of Gaius' division 
of objects by the rationalist and axiomatic division of rights: set out 
definitions, expound their conditions, expound their effects in a systematic 
way: 
Partant de l'observation du monde, il note l'existence de res in commercio, qui 
se divise en corporelles et incorporelles. Mais examinant l'utilité des choses 
pour le Droit, il adopte un autre point de vue, admettant des Jura, au sens de 
droits subjectifs, qui peuvent ou bien avoir directement pour objet les res (jura 
in re) ou bien simplement les concerner ( j u r a ad rem).74 
67. Id., no. 245. 
68. Id., no. 214. 
69. Ibid. 
70. Id., no. 254. 
71. Id., no. 245. 
72. A.-J. ARNAUD, Les origines doctrinales du Code civil français, Paris, Librairie générale de 
droit et de jurisprudence, 1969. 
73. De diversis regulis juris antiqui, L.50, T. 17, in Pandectae Justinianeae in novum ordinem 
digestae, 1748-52. Arnaud claims the design is prolonged twenty years later in the Traité 
du droit de domaine de propriété ; but that is not clear. 
74. A.J. ARNAUD, supra, note 72, p. 165. 
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Arnaud sees here the watershed or truchement in France between the system 
of Gaius who sees only res, and the system of Struve who sees things only in 
terms of their utility, an individualist inspiration75. From le père du Code 
civil the future commentators take the hints of their explanations76. Pothier 
popularized if not created the term démembrements of real rights77, and 
conceived them as dismemberments of the principal right, the right of 
property, from which they emanate78. Although property is listed with 
possession as a corporeal res, and the dismemberments as incorporeals79, 
both are now rights primarily, property a right being divided into other 
rights instead of primarily a sensible thing upon which intellectual distinc-
tions can be made. 
2.2.3. Nineteenth Century Commentary: Aubry and Rail 
It is agreed on all sides that not the Code Napoléon but its commentators 
Aubry and Rau are responsible for the grand development of patrimonial 
theory, if not its origin, in the French civilian group. The climate is 
dependent upon the new code. They follow it in spirit : "ils ont voulu, avant 
tout, faire ressortir l'idée maîtresse du Code civil, opposant l'unité à la 
diversité"80. They follow also the methodology required by it : "the task was 
for the interpreter alone, with his eyes fixed on nothing but the code", i.e., a 
method of "individualism and self-assertion", since no longer steeped in the 
context of pre-codal caselaw — their first edition appeared in 1839 — and 
neither bound by nor helped by current caselaw insofar as both civil and 
penal codes had forbidden courts to engage in legislative activities81. 
75. George-Adam Struve's Pandectes of 1670 commences with the global category of jus, not 
res. Of interest is his division of real rights into dominium singulare (including all 
dismemberments of property and property too) and dominium universale (i.e., succession à 
titre universel). Unfortunately, his work was unavailable for study, other than through 
Arnaud's brief chart, taken from Villey. 
76. A.J. ARNAUD, supra, note 72, pp. 166-167. 
77. S. GINOSSAR, supra, note 18, p. 108, no. 41, n.198. 
78. Supra, note 62, no. 2, p. 101. 
79. A.J. ARNAUD, supra, note 72, p. 167 ; although Pothier also so divided choses, in Traité des 
personnes et des choses, no. 232, in Œuvres, supra, note 62, p. 87. Also, the initial distinction 
Arnaud at p. 166 finds in Pothier between res in commercio and res extra commercium is 
only minimal although it would have been of interest to the present investigations. It 
appears only as : "Toutes les choses corporelles ou incorporelles, qui ne sont point du droit 
divin ou du droit public, sont du droit privé" : Pandectae, XXIII, Paris, Dondy-Dupré, 
1818, p. 315. Finally, the only mention of things as of a universal right is the universalités 
of public law, i.e., those universal because they belong to universitates : id., p. 304. 
80. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 45, p. 18, no.23. 
81. J.-P. DAWSON, Oracles of the Law, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Law School, 1968, 
p. 395. 
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Illustrating what have been termed the harmful effects of codification, viz., 
no proposals of model just law but mere exegesis along with a nationalism 
encouraged by this legal positivism 82, Aubry laid out nineteenth-century 
methods to the law faculty of Strasbourg, of which he was dean, in 1857: 
professors are 
to dispense legal education in the name of the state, a mission to protest in a 
measured way not doubt but firmly against every innovation that would tend 
to substitute a will other than the legislator's.83 
The method is paralleled in the content of their doctrine, for it is the 
ultimacy of will which will later be viewed as underlying the attachment of 
patrimony to person. 
The setting of the doctrine of patrimony within the whole of their 
doctrine is laid out in their preface84. The study of the civil law has two 
parts, the first on persons and the second on goods ; this second part has two 
books, the first on goods taken individually and the second on goods taken 
universally. This second book is the theory of patrimony and has two 
divisions the first on patrimony taken generally and the second on patrimony 
taken as applied. This seems standard enough, up until the second book ; but 
there are features of the first part and of the second part's first book, which 
are already eccentric and which lead with logical necessity to the second 
book. That is, patrimony is not a peculiar addendum to an otherwise 
pedestrian exposition, but is an essential part of a revised notion of law, if 
not its goal. 
The situation of person in the first part is that "l'homme est envisagé 
comme personne juridique, abstraction faite des droits qu'il peut avoir en 
cette qualité, suivant les diverses positions dans lesquelles il se trouve placé". 
Legal person is usually seen by jurists of the modern era as equivalent to the 
bearer of rights and duties, a bearer exhausted by them for legal purposes, 
and thus not available for study but through them. Aubry and Rau do leave 
this quality which defines legal person, however ; it is only that man is being 
abstracted from that which constitutes him. The authors take back with one 
hand what they gave with the other. The rights, in turn, do not attach to him 
qua person, but insofar as he is located in concrete circumstances. Person, if 
distinct from patrimony, is so only precariously : he is constituted by rights, 
but is separated from them ; his essence is rights, but they arise from 
situations. 
82. R. DAVID and J.E.C. BRIERLEY, Major legal Systems in the World Today, IIs1 Engl, ed., 
London, Strauss, 1968, p. 51. 
83. J.P. DAWSON, supra, note 81, quoted from J. BONNECASSE, L'école de l'exégèse, p. 1819. 
84. C. AUBRY and C. RAU, Cours de droit civil français d'après la méthode de Zachariae, I, 
4e éd., 1869, pp. vi-vii. Unfortunately neither the first edition of 1838 nor any earlier 
edition than the fourth was available for consultation. 
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The characterization of rights is equally noteworthy ; rights "peuvent 
appartenir aux personnes sur les objets du monde extérieur avec lesquels 
elles se trouvent en rapport". Relations are ultimate, rights lie on their hither 
side, objects lie yonder. Rights are "upon" the external world, but are not 
the relations themselves. However, it is the objects and not the rights which 
form the content of the patrimony, indeed of the whole law of goods. "Or, 
ces objets ne doivent pas être envisagés seulement dans leur individualité, 
mais comme faisant partie intégrante d'une universalité juridique (Patri-
moine)". "Objects in the external world" make up patrimony as its integral 
parts ; its parts are not rights, nor even goods/biens. Even the category of 
things/choses is eschewed although it seems not only to express the idea but 
also to be the traditional term. Note that no reason is offered here for why 
we "must" study objects in their universality, that is, why we need patrimony 
at all. 
This terminology is not consistently kept to ; for the first book of part 
two "s'occupe des droits sur les objets" outside in their individuality, while 
the second is the book "dans lequel les objets des droits de l'homme sont 
envisagés" within patrimony. The novel terminology of objects, pointed up 
by the underlining now added, perhaps is insisted upon to the detriment of 
their doctrine's clarity because of the novelty the authors recognize in their 
efforts ; for the general theory of patrimony "comble ainsi une regrettable 
lacune qui se rencontre dans les autres ouvrages de Droit civil français", in 
which they are regrettably correct. 
What does the theory of patrimony cover? What considerations can be 
made under that rubric which cannot be made under particular rights? 
While taking rights individually serves as the vehicle for a wide range of 
studies85, these objects taken universally have only one suggested appli-
cation : the second book of part two "contient ensuite l'application spéciale 
de cette théorie à l'acquisition du patrimoine d'une personne décédée..., et 
traite accessoirement des donations entre vifs, et des legs à titre particulier". 
Moving from the prefaced design into the treatment proper of patrimony 
in the second book of part two, there appear the ways of defining patrimony 
seen in the preface : "l'ensemble des biens d'une personne, envisagé comme 
formant une universalité du droit"86 ; and "le droit de propriété dont toute 
85. Real rights (of property, of servitudes personal (!) and real, of hypothecs and privileges), 
personal rights (obligations), droits de puissance et de famille (leaving little scope for a 
critique that the first part on person-as-abstracted-for-rights is concerned with person's 
extrapatrimonial rights as distinct from rights upon the external world or patrimonial, 
since today's extrapatrimonial rights are included within patrimony). 
86. Supra, note 84, IX, 5e éd. par E. BARTIN, 1917, p. 333, no. 573. 
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personne jouit sur son patrimoine," i.e., upon patrimony in the first sense87. 
Patrimony in the second sense is a bien inné since inherent in personality88, 
and so it is in theory a member of patrimony in the first sense, although in 
practice it does not so function since there is no suit upon it until it is 
violated ans losses in money appear89. 
There is no distinction drawn between the sources of universality of the 
two: the second is not acquirable, since "inhérent à sa personnalité 
même"90; and the first is one and indivisible, "comme la personnalité 
même", "à raison de l'unité de la personne"91. It is one, "étant une émanation 
de la personnalité, et l'expression de la puissance juridique dont une 
personne se trouve investie comme telle"92, "déduit directement de celle 
[idée] de la personnalité"93. 
The right (patrimony
 2) is more identified, however, with the personality 
that are the goods (patrimony,), in these expressions, although the first sense 
is also identified with personality: "le patrimoine étant... la personnalité 
même de l'homme", "le patrimoine d'une personne est sa puissance 
juridique"94. Patrimony2 (right) is universal by being the personality; 
patrimony , (objects) is universal by being related to personality. How is it 
related to personality? It is "soumis au libre arbitre d'une seule et même 
volonté, à l'action d'un seul et même pouvoir juridique"95. That is, 
patrimony
 2 is the control, patrimony, is what is controlled ; and the control 
is single because the controller is single, viz., the will, or its free choice. Thus 
far, one sees the unity of patrimony2, but hardly that of patrimony,. 
And the authors agree. For while both patrimonies are inalienable and 
not acquirable, only patrimony2 (the right of property over patrimony,, 
which right is a member of patrimony ,) is absolutely indivisible, whereas patri-
mony, is indivisible only in principle. But looking first to their features 
in common, the authors say only of patrimony, (objects) that only 
persons, physical or moral, may have one96; but it is no leap to say 
that they would agree the same is true of patrimony
 2, although in strict 
logic — and in some legal systems — there is no contradiction between 
finding the right of property in one location and the control elsewhere. 
87. Id, p. 339, no. 577. 
88. Id, 1°. 
89. Id., pp. 334-335, no. 573, 2°. 
90. Id., p. 339, no. 577, 1°. 
91. Id., p. 336, no. 574, 1°. 
92. Id., p. 335, no. 573, 4°. 
93. Id., p. 333, no. 573, 1°. 
94. Id., n.6. 
95. Id., p. 334, no. 573, 1°. 
96. Id., p. 336, no. 573, 4°, #1. 
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Secondly, they explicitly require of both patrimonies that they be ina-
lienable and unacquirable. Regarding patrimony „ every person neces-
sarily has one, despite actually possessing nothing97; that is, the exis-
tence of personality comprehends not only its existence in actu but also 
its existence in potentia upon objects. As such, patrimony is not only actual 
control but also potential control, and so inalienable by merely disposing of 
what is actually controlled98. Regarding patrimony2, it cannot be detached 
from the person because it has no independent existence of its own, so there 
is nothing to detach99. 
Looking next to their differing features, patrimony
 r differs from 
patrimony
 2 because the former is indivisible only in principle while the latter 
is indivisible absolutely. As for the universality of goods (patrimony,), the 
following divisions are found in fact : between different sorts of goods, in the 
Old Law though not in the modern l0°, although it is "contrary to reason" to 
use natural qualities to divide intellectual entities; into two universalities 
consisting of aliquot parts, which are intellectual parts, not natural, for each 
of which the heirs come à titre universel101 ; and between the universality of 
patrimony and the universality of some other patrimony formed out of it 
and split off from it102. But as for the right of property over patrimony i 
(viz., patrimony
 2), this is divisible not even into intellectual parts. Are not 
the several aliquot parts, making universal heirs as they say [sic], a 
97. Id, #2. 
98. Id., p. 334, no. 573, 2°, n.6. For this reason, they find the German terra Vermoegen even 
more expressive than patrimoine, for the former expresses both power and patrimony. 
Two fallacies appear here : the potentiality to acquire objects does not include the 
potentiality of the objects to be acquired — unless the sense of patrimony under discussion 
here has merged with patrimony2 — but that would beg the question; and although 
alienating actual patrimony, does not involve alienating potential patrimony
 2, it may 
nonetheless be possible to alienate the latter in some way. 
99. Id., p. 350, no. 577, 2°. It would be worth asking why this distinguishes the right of 
property over patrimony from other rights which are surely alienable. Being "inherent in 
the very personality", 1°, is explanatory of this difference only if it is not itself explained 
circularly in terms of the difference ; but it is. 
100. Id., p. 336, no. 574, 1°. 
101. Ibid., and p. 339, 3°. 
102. Such are the patrimonies kept at a distance from one's own by: benefit of inventory; 
separation of patrimonies; droit de retour, the return to ascendents of gifts to children 
deceased childless and single ; the absentee's goods ; held fiduciarily ; the wife's reserve : 
ibid., 2°. The distinct is highly relevant : only division within the patrimony can be an 
objection to its individuality, whereas all these examples are divisions from patrimony. At 
most, these could serve as objections to the principle that a person can have one and only 
one patrimony, not that patrimony is indivisible. Unfortunately, most critics have argued 
against the latter using the same examples that the originators themselves offer. However, 
even the first objection is unfounded: the same person holds not two patrimonies of his 
own, but one of his own and one of someone else. 
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counterinstance to this claim? No, for the integrity of the patrimony persists 
since heirs to any intestacy represent the deceased integrally, despite the 
presence of multiple "universal" heirs, i.e., à titre universel101. That is, as 
long as the personality is represented universally by only one, then there is 
no contradiction to the indivisibility of patrimony falling into multiple 
universalities 104. 
Patrimony
 2 (right) has no parts ; patrimony, (objects) has intellectual 
parts, but the objects in patrimony , are not its parts, only the objects which 
have lost their particularity in being universalized. They form parts of 
patrimony , not by reason of their own natures but by reason of being biens, 
that is, not having usefulness themselves but having something useful which 
they can procure ; as such, they have a money value 105. But the money value 
of some is not estimable until after their violation106 ; these fall outside 
patrimony,, and outside patrimony2 since this is defined in terms of the 
former. Finally, objects form patrimony , only after debts are subtracted 107. 
Subtracted from which goods ? The question is pointless : "goods" has lost 
its particular meaning by being universalized. 
In summary, patrimony is a universality. A universality is required 
because personality is universal. The universality negatively consists in the 
absence of distinction, multiplicity, divisibility, separability. It consists 
positively in the characteristic feature of person : his will. His will controls 
objects (patrimony ,) ; he is or he owns that control (patrimony
 2 : droit de 
propriété upon patrimony ,). The characteristic feature of will is its singleness 
by reason of being set off from multiple material objects. The will is 
rights 108. 
103. Supra, note 86, p. 351, no. 577, 4°. 
104. The explanation, of course, overlooks both the split between personality and patrimony 
which this introduces, and also that the singleness of heirs to an intestacy who may be 
multiple can arise only ipso jure, as the authors say, which can mean here only "by fiction 
of the law". 
105. Supra, note 86, p. 334, no. 573, 1°. 
106. Id, p. 335, no. 573, 2°. 
107. Id, 3°. 
108. It is here that Speth's critique shows more how a contemporary still shares this underlying 
assumption of these modern authors, rather than rebutting it. He finds the two senses of 
patrimony to be the principal source of confusion. Namely, while he finds no problem for 
his theory of affectation (discussed later in this study) in patrimony,, the problem is 
insuperable regarding patrimony
 2, which certainly does mean an inner, inalienable and 
indivisible right "dans la conception actuelle des droits naturels de l'homme" : p. 14, supra, 
note 45, no. 13, nn.2 and 3. That is, attchment to will by rights would still demand univer-
sality, since the comonplaces regarding will persist. 
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The fact that patrimony serves as common pledge must be modified, on 
this theory. Creditors cannot strip the debtor of his patrimonial rights, but 
only exercise his rights in his stead109. Likewise its feature of being the 
continuation of personality must be altered. Instead of an inheritance 
continuing the moral person, as originally, it continues the legal person. 
Blondel suggests that, once the codifiers had dispensed with continuation of 
the person morally, the nineteenth century commentators had do reintroduce 
it logically. Instead of heirs continuing the deceased extrapatrimonially, they 
continue him patrimonially, with the danger that the family that is no more 
would overcome the family being born. Aubry and Rau, Blondel says, 
pushed this logic furthest, by developing "une continuation juridique grâce à 
la construction abstraite du patrimoine autour de la personne et inséparable 
de celle-ci" uo . But Blondel locates their need to develop such an envelope 
abstracted from contents in their need to explain codai provisions once the 
codifiers had taken away the former tool, viz., moral personality. He does 
not continue further and find the nub of both the exclusion and its 
replacement in the modern will, which Aubry and Rau admit. 
Their theory of patrimony has suffered critique, but it still forms the 
substance of modern French civilian theory ; it has not been replaced, even 
by objectivist theory to be seen later, but only critiqued111. And even the 
critiques have taken the cover of the classical theory itself: Aubry and Rau, 
as altered by Bartin who edited their sixth edition 112 ; Colin and Capitant, by 
their editor Julliot de la Morandière, and Planiol and Ripert, by their editor 
Picard113. 
2.2.4. Nineteenth Century Commentary: Zachariae 
Aubry and Rau's title acknowledges their dependence upon Karl S. 
Zachariae von Lingenthal, and in their preface they specify this as a 
dependency in overall design. They also note that no Frenchman has 
developed a general theory of patrimony. Their development of such a 
theory is generally adknowledged to be dependent upon Zachariae ; and in 
109. C. AUBRY, and C. RAU, supra, note 86, IX, p. 366, no. 579. 
110. P. BLONDEL, supra, note 56, p. 36, no. 44. 
111. Encyclopédie Dalloz in its Répertoire de Droit civil repeats the theory without critique : 1953 
edition, III, pp. 732-733, by G. RIPERT; 2nd edition, 1970-1976, V, by P. ROBINO. 
112. At IX, no. 573, he abandons the idea that the relation between a person and every object in 
his patrimony consists in a right of property, i.e., a property over objects including both 
corporeal things and incorporeal rights, which is essential to patrimony
 2, and thus to 
patrimony,. S. GINOSSAR, supra, note 18, p. 39, no. 15, n. 71 draws attention to this 
alteration. 
113. These editors excised their mentors' acceptance of the indivisibility of patrimony, and 
replaced it with the theory of affectation, according to Speth, supra, note 45, pp. 24-25. 
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its execution they constantly relate their theory to his, while never so 
slavishly as later commentators do. Zachariae's conception of patrimony can 
highlight the assumptions and objections to the one Aubry and Rau fed into 
French law. 
Aurbry and Rau's first edition in 1839 of volume one of the French 
translation of Zachariae "4 is taken from his third German edition of the 
Handbuch des franzoesischen Recht in 1827 "5. As successive editions, its 
characteristic feature is to treat the code first theoretically, giving the ratio-
nale of substantive law, and only later to treat it practically, i.e., in terms of 
procedure and evidence. In the thoeoretical portion he takes the approach 
familiar from Aubry and Rau of treating first of rights without reference to 
objects, in a second part "des droits civils considérés sous le rapport des 
objets auxquels ils s'appliquent". Also familiar is his treatment of them first 
individually, and as a universality or patrimony in a second book "des objets 
extérieurs envisagés comme éléments constitutifs du patrimoine d'une 
personne" : This is preceded by several volumes of book one dealing with 
property and other rights, again as Aubry and Rau116. 
In the introductory passage to the objects of rights, patrimony is given 
two definitions : the ensemble of a person's biens117 ; and the ensemble of a 
person's rights. The ensemble is an ensemble juridique, universalité de droit, 
114. Not to be confused with the first edition of their own treatise of the preceding year. 
115. K.S. ZACHARIAE, Cours de droit civil français, tr. de l'allemand de la lre éd. par C. AUBRY 
et C. RAU, I, Strasbourg, Lugier, 1839. It has not been possible to consult the first German 
edition, nor to discover its year of publication. 
116. This is distinct from G. Massé and Ch. Verge's third edition of Aubry and Rau's French 
translation made from Zachariae's fifth edition, which the former acknowledge to be 
freely rearranged. Therein "the second place" is a chapter, not a book ; it comes early in 
the second volume ; it is followed by the treatment of property, not preceded by it ; and it is 
named "des choses appartenant à une personne considérées comme une universalité 
juridique, ou du patrimoine". It is not extravagent to see here a change in the conception 
of patrimony, parallel to that worked upon Aubry and Rau by Bartin in 1917, despite the 
similarity in content between these sections in first and third French translations. The first 
edition concerns objects, which while external leave room to include both choses and 
droits ; in the third, choses only. In the first, they are considered constitutive elements ; in 
the third, only the universality is considered. In the first, the right of property is an exercise 
upon individual objects primarily although also exercised upon patrimony itself; in the 
third, the belonging/appartenance is an activity upon things primarily as they appear in 
patrimony, and only on the model of patrimony upon things individually in the 
subsequent title. That is to say, the success of the theory's first thirty years has acted to 
modify the theory itself, giving it place of honour, and making property a right exercised 
within it rather than as originally both within it an upon it. 
117. This is the only definition given later, "l'universalité juridique de ses biens", biens being 
external objects on which he has rights to exercise insofar as they are considered as biens : 
supra, note 115, IV, 1844, p. 99, no. 573. 
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united by reason of the unity of the person to whom the biens belong. There 
are other legal universalities than patrimony, alongside it118, exemplified by 
those Aubry and Rau found to be examples of a division in patrimony. The 
patrimony is not a "collection of objects", a universalité de fait, united by 
reason of a common use or by reason of having the same species119, or even 
by reason of that bond which is the act of will turning them to that common 
end ; this act of will is a question of intention, a fact, and not a matter of 
law 120. Nonetheless, an act of will can turn a factual universality into a legal 
universality, viz., the act of will which leaves an inheritance121. 
The reason why patrimony must be postulated, as a legal universality, 
depends upon the characterization of its elements. Civil rights are the matter 
under study. Civil rights have objects. Their objects are corporeal (sensible), 
or incorporeal (intelligible), i.e., including rights and patrimony122; that is, 
rights can have rights for objects. The objects are also either outside and 
independent of person, or identified with his existence. The latter are biens 
innés, e.g., body, liberty, honour123. The latter are indeed included in 
patrimony124 ; but need not be treated separately because they only become 
manifest when violated, sued upon and become rights over external 
objects 125. 
These external objects have utility. Utility is wider than money value ; it 
includes everything which can contribute to man's moral or material well-
being ; as such, even persons can be biens126. Only as such do objects enter 
into a patrimony, and as such they are called biens121. They are an 
abstraction128, as is patrimony itself129. Thus they suffer no distinctions. The 
persons holding rights on an object may be multiple, and so its utility can be 
divided among them 13° ; but the constitutive nature of the objects is not such 
as to distinguish them, either into corporeals and incorporeals, or into 
moveables and immoveables131. The utility is acquired as a quality of objects 
118. Id, I, p. 333, no. 168. 
119. Id, p. 334. 
120. Id, n.10. 
121. Id, p. 333. 
122. Id, p. 331. 
123. Id, p. 333, no. 168. 
124. Id, IV, p. 99, no. 573, 1°. 
125. Id, I, p. 332, no. 168, and n.3. 
126. Id., n.5. 
127. Id, I, p. 332, no. 168; IV, p. 100, no. 573, 3°. 
128. Id, I, p. 333, no. 168. 
129. Id, IV, p. 100, no. 573, 2°. 
130. Id., I, p. 332, no. 168. 
131. Id, I, p. 333, and nn.6 and 7; IV, p. 100, 3°. 
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only when they are put under control of rights ; biens thus are the result of 
rights of which they are the material. Rights are the cause, biens the effect132. 
There is a leap then to be made : patrimony, "c'est la personnalité même de 
l'homme mise en rapport avec les différents objets de ses droits. Il forme 
donc un tout juridique, une universalité de droit" 133. The content of the leap 
is unmistakable : as the missing premises, personality must be identified with 
rights, and rights with control. On the further edge, this is what gives the 
utility ; on the nearer side, this control is not identified with acts, with the 
actual fact of that action being performed, but with their faculty, the will. 
Will and its control are single ; so also is patrimony, its object. Will's control 
as the precondition for utility or biens fully defines them, so it is total ; and so 
is patrimony, for objects before the faculty of human will have only one 
character — utility — and so are indistinguishible and fungible. These are 
the features which define a universality ; this is the faculty which necessitates 
it. 
Patrimony is needed as a universality because of the useful character of 
the goods which compose it, a character which is the result of control. The 
control is man, and it is exercised upon objects. The only supplementary 
considerations required are continuation of that personality, and its control 
by the right of property. 
"Le droit de propriété, absorbant toute l'utilité de l'objet qui y est 
soumis, se confond, en quelque sorte, avec cet objet qui en est le repré-
sentant" 134. Property is the fullest utility, there is none left over; but since 
utility is the object so far as relevant to law, there is nothing of the object left 
over. So the immaterial right is materially represented by the material object. 
The same is not true of other real and personal rights, which are control of 
only part of the utility of objects135. 
Although patrimony is not an external object136, it is an object of the 
right of property 137. "The ensemble of a person's biens is basically nothing 
other than the collective utility of all his civil rights" 138. That is to say, 
132. Id., I, p. 333, no. 168, and n.8. 
133 Id, IV, p. 100, no. 573, 2°. 
134. Id, I, p. 333, no. 168, n.6. 
135. Ibid. This is why it is not nonsensical to distinguish biens, which are incorporeal, into 
corporeal and incorporeal. In his 1855 edition, Zachariae clarifies that when the 
dismemberment of property bears upon even all the goods of another, it does not bear 
properly upon his patrimony, a universalité, but upon a généralité: M.,II, 1855, p. 47, 
no. 270. 
136. Id., IV, 1844, p. 100, no. 573, 2°. 
137. Id., p. 102 ff, no. 575. 
138. Id, I, p. 333, no. 168, n.9. 
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patrimony is utility collectivized ; though not an external object, it has about 
it whatever there is about an external object which allows it to stand as an 
object of the right of property, viz., utility. Zachariae puts it more 
elliptically, that "patrimony is founded in man's personality" 139. 
Searching for principles of this property in patrimony which are "vrai 
sous le rapport philosophique", the right of property in patrimony is 
indivisible, inalienable and unacquirable. This property is "indivisible 
comme la personnalité même". Thus it is indifferent to time: acquired at 
different times, the credits and debits relate indiscriminatelyI40. It can be 
alienated as a whole only in death, not while living141. Objects constitute 
patrimony only by their legal relation to person, which ceases at alienation ; 
they no longer constitute patrimony, such that alienating them would be 
alienating patrimony. It can be lost only "en perdant la personnalité même", 
and so one cannot ever be distant enough from it to acquire his own 
patrimony, either 142. 
But he can acquire another's patrimony, i.e., be the ayant droit of his 
droit de propriété, once the other is separated from it by death. But he can do 
so only by representing the other, continuing him 143, 
et forme une seule et même personne avec ce propriétaire, puisque le 
patrimoine d'une personne, c'est la personne même, considérée sous le rapport 
de son empire sur un ensemble de biens, envisagés eux-mêmes comme la 
propriété d'une personne déterminée. 
Nearly everything is here : their property is their control {empire), which is 
the person, which is the patrimony, with all of which any pretending 
successor must identify himself. The editors of the 1855 French edition add a 
.two-page footnote to Zachariae's study of property itself which sums up 
these points while strangely turning the meaning144. Quoting Portalis' 
presentation to the Corps législatif that "le principe du droit de propriété est 
en nous" as a rebuttal of the Revolutionaries who sought in the law the 
origin of property, the editors continue that "la propriété est l'extension 
de la personnalité de l'homme aux choses qu'il a créées, ou dont il a créé la 
139. Id., IV, p. 102, no. 575. 
140. Ibid. And thus heirs are bound to the indivisibility : they cannot accept only in part ; they 
are held for all charges and not just prorata ; and the inheritance must be all intestate or all 
testamentary, not mixed. Rationally true, the last two effects are alleviated by positive 
law: id., p. 103. 
141. Id., IV, p. 105, no. 576, 3°. 
142. Id., p. 104, no. 575. 
143. Id., II, 1855, p. 44, no. 268. Although then Zachariae no longer asserted a right of property 
over patrimony, his explanation here is informative regarding his earlier notion. 
144. Id., pp. 50-51, no. 274, n.l. 
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valeur..." Pufendorf and Wolff, belonging to what is later called the School 
of law of Nature, had to be corrected by Locke and by his imitators among 
the Physiocrats who "en avait démontré la nature, en faisant ressortir les 
avantages". What is lost in this otherwise suggestive hypothesis of whence 
came Zachariae's theory that the code universalizes patrimony as the utility 
of goods, is Zachariae's insistence that this is a legal universality and not a 
natural one. The control is the empire of will which makes law in making 
value. The next step must be to trace back that notion. 
This radicalization of the doctrine is visible in Zachariae's attitude 
toward his research, an attitude the direct opposite of Aubry and Rau 145. 
There must "exist in all Europe, at least among the interpreters of the civil 
law, as among those who study nature, a union which no difference of a 
political nature would upset" 146. The scientific doctrine referred to is one 
which achieves that unanimity without reducing it to the common availability 
of natural fact. Rather it is what is done with fact that is shared, which 
accords with the Zachariae seen above. The heritage is summarized usefully 
by Del Vecchio, a summary which schematizes the subsequent research 
herein : 
The Law of Nature School, which became more precisely the Law of Reason 
School, above all through the efforts of Kant, reached the greatest heights with 
Fichte in the first phase of his thought... K. Grosz, K. Zachariae, A. Bauer, 
W. Krug, C. Droste-Huelshoff are still other writers in this School.... All these 
authors hold firmly to the principle that an ideal law exists before the positive 
law... From this comes a sort of logical schematism, and a character which at 
times can seem too strongly individualistic in its treatment of social problems.147 
All that is lacking from this junction of Zachariae to Fichte to Kant to 
Leibnitz, Wolff and Grotius is the role of Savigny's mediation of Fichte to 
Zachariae, and the influence of the earlier tieback of the writers in the Ancien 
droit to the "hommes, éclairés" by the Locke of Voltaire's Lettres philo-
sophiques; sur les anglais. But Zachariae's freedom from the chauvinism of 
Aubry and Rau and his greater willingness to propose reforms to the 
codified French law which serves as his vehicle for exposition of the law, hint 
145. Following Zachanae overall, Aubry and Rau differ in their unwillingness to divide 
patrimony into a patrimony of moveables and one of immoveables, as well as to admit 
that patrimony as a universality can be lost by civil death (supra, note 86, p. 337, no. 574, 
1°, and p. 351, no. 577, 3°, n.9), both of which Zachariae admits (supra, note 115, IV, 
p. 101, no. 574, and no. 578). That is, the French authors carry further that abstractness 
the German theorist introduced. 
146. Handbuch des franzoesischen Rechts, 3. Aufl., 1827, in R. DAVID and J. BRIERLEY, supra, 
note 82, p. 51, n.30. 
147. G. DEL VECCHIO, Philosophy of Law, tr. T.O. MARTIN from 8th ed. of 1952, Washington, 
U.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1953, pp. 119-120. 
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that his rooting of patrimony in will has relationships which may have been 
lost upon the later authors for whom patrimony appears as an institutio-
nalized category to be taken unquestioningly as part of their tools, albeit 
critiqued intramurally. 
2.2.5. Nineteenth Century Legal Philosophy: Savigny 
What leads Zachariae to the conception of patrimony which Aubry and 
Rau take from him? The code and codifiers would not provoke such a 
construction by their use of the term patrimoine, even if it were agreed that 
they could bear its weight. Faced with either a pure novelty or a deve-
lopment of a doctrinal tradition, one is inclined to look for the latter. It is 
not far to seek. 
Although the first volume of Friedrick Karl von Savigny's treatise148 
was not published until thirteen years after the third German edition of 
Zachariae and two years after Aubry and Rau's first translation and first 
treatise, it still is their formative influence insofar as it represents more 
frankly than either the themes which appear in both but which are curtailed 
there, themes which are those of the eighteenth century, of the Enlightenment 
and of post-Medieval thought generally. Because he defines Vermoegen in his 
eighth volume on private international law as the reflection of the deceased's 
person, ideales Object von unbestimmten Inhalt, thus disposing of Zachariae's 
distinction between moveable and immoveable patrimony, "Savigny semble 
bien être le premier à avoir développé la notion unitaire de patrimoine reprise 
en droit civil par Aubry et Rau" 149. Even today, says Boulanger, no one has 
answered his critiques of the divisions in successions. 
Savigny's "complete and systematic formulation of the program of the 
Historical School" 15° is in part a reaction of restoration against the French 
Revolution's excesses. Based on the negation of sovereignty and replacing it 
with the popular juridical consciousness, so that every people has its own 
spirit and every popular spirit its own definite law, nationality is expunged as 
a criterion of jurisdiction from civil law and is restricted to public law. Only 
the law of domicile can govern successions 1M. 
148. System des heutigen roemischen Rechts, I, 1840 ; simultaneously published as Traité de droit 
romain, I, tr. Ch. GUENOUX, Paris, Firmin Didot, 1840. The French edition was the only 
one available for research. 
149. Emphasis in F. BOULANGER, supra, note 33, p. 44, n.46, translating Savigny's phrase as 
"objet idéal à contenu indéterminé" from System, VIII, 1845, p. 296. 
150. G. DEL VECCHIO, supra, note 147, p. 130. 
151. F. BOULANGER, supra, note 33, p. 59, no. 62; p. 45, no. 47. 
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But the popular history that is relevant for him is "the history of a 
concept as it evolved in Roman law... a central, ordering principle — 
possession as a manifestation of human will" 152. Del Vecchio repeats the 
commonplace that, for Savigny, the Roman law seen as the work of will is a 
substitute for the natural law Savigny attacked as unscientific153. While 
Savigny gives the first theoretical discussion of law as jural relations 1S4, the 
prominence of this instrument cannot obscure the yet deeper nerve, for "la 
personne est au centre de toute relation juridique, non la chose" 155. And the 
will is at the centre of person 156. 
Every Jural Relation consists in the relation of one person to another person. 
The first essential element of that relation which requires a closer conside-
ration, is the nature of the persons whose reciprocal relation is capable of 
producing it. 
So, for example, the succession is "l'extension de la puissance et de la 
volonté de l'homme au-delà des termes de la vie" 157. The nature and effects 
of will as ground of law is what shall be sought out. 
Le droit (law) as a penetrating environment is a power of the individual. 
Within the limits of this power, the will of the individual is supreme. The 
power or faculty is called droit (right, subjectif). This right is visible only in 
defence against its violations ; but this is an accidental and abstract side of 
right. The profound reality of right is the jural relation {rapport de droit), an 
organic balance of parts 158. 
Droit as the general rule governing particular cases is a droit objectif. 
This is visible only in a law, in the sense of a rule authorized by the State ; but 
its basis is again jural relation. The jural relation is the reality which makes 
the abstractions intelligible ; thus legal theory and practice are one '" . 
Summarily, statutory and case law find their root in right, objective and 
subjective, respectively. Right finds its root in jural relation. Jural relation 
152. J.P. DAWSON, supra, note 81, p. 452. 
153. Supra, note 147, p. 134. 
154. H. CAIRNS, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1949, p. 470. 
155. F. BOULANGER, supra, note 33, p. 43, no. 46. 
156. F.K. SAVIGNY, Jural Relations or the Roman Law of Persons as Subjects of Jural Relations, 
tr. W.H. RATTIGAN from Savigny's System of Modern Roman Law, II, London, Wildy, 
1884, p. 1, no. 60. 
157. F. BOULANGER, supra, note 33, p. 43, no. 46, tr. "Erstreckung des Willens und der Macht 
eines Menschen über die Grenze des Lebens" from System, VIII, 1849, p. 295. 
158. K.F. SAVIGNY, supra, note 148, I, pp. 7-8, no. 4. 
159. Id., pp. 9-11, no. 5. Despite Savigny's frequent criticisms of Hegel, he accepts the 
nineteenth century dialectician's view that "abstract" means partial, while "reason" means 
whole. 
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finds its root in will. The arrangement is translated in a passage from 
paragraph fifty-two famous enough to be quoted by Pound: 
Man stands in the midst of the external world, and the most important element 
in his environment is contact with those who are like him in their nature and 
destiny. If free beings are to coexist in such a condition of contact, furthering 
rather than hindering each other in their development, invisible boundaries 
must be recognized within which the existence and activity of each individual 
gains a secure free opportunity. The rules whereby such boundaries are 
determined and through them this free opportunity is secured are the law.160 
Savigny stresses that law is, therefore, an expansion of freedom rather than 
its confinement. Instead of law commencing with injustice which must be 
remedied by negation in the form of a restriction of wills, in accord with the 
restrictions of morals, law begins with the new power which the State 
introduces, by assigning each person a domain wherein his will reigns 
independent of every foreign will. "Laws serves morality not by carrying out 
its precepts, but by ensuring the individual the exercise of this free choice" 161. 
The jural relation is the domain of free choice162. 
Law gives form to this relation ; but not all relations need it163. For 
example, will acts upon (1) oneself and (2) the world outside one, either (a) 
on unfree nature or (b) on other persons, whether (i) as unfree or (ii) as also 
free. (1) There is no meaning to any right over oneself. Having a right over 
the intellectual freedoms or incolumitas animi would imply that they could 
be impeded and thus violated, but that is impossible164. Having a right over 
one's body or incolumitas corporis would legitimate suicide, and this is 
unacceptable. Having rights of property or by obligations are artificial 
extensions of our personal power, but they are artificial, acquired and 
transitory, while the person is original and natural. What remains unmis-
takably to man for himself is "que l'homme dispose licitement de lui-même 
et de ses facultés" 165. There is no right of property over oneself. Inviolability 
of person is the end of the extensions of one's power in property and 
obligation. But if by personality one understands just the capacity for rights, 
then these rights of personality are patently artificial, invented for no other 
purpose than the protection of possession166. 
160. As repeated by CAIRNS, supra, note 154, p. 401. While visible in Pound's translation the 
fact that the "free opportunity" is itself isolated, needing boundaries only to confirm it, is 
clearer in the French text, which translates this as "parallel development", K.F. SAVIGNY, 
supra, note 148, I, p. 326, no. 52. 
161. K.F. SAVIGNY, supra, note 148, I, pp. 326-327, no. 52. 
162. Id, p. 328, no. 53. 
163. Id, p. 328, no. 52. 
164. Id., p. 329, no. 53. 
165. Id., p. 330, no. 53. 
166. Id., pp. 331-332, no. 53, and n.(a). 
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Rights (2) over the external world consist in its domination by our will, 
(a) We cannot dominate the whole of unfree nature, but only some portion 
cut off from the whole: choses. Right to a thing, in its most pure and 
complete form, is called property, (b) Over free beings, (i) absolute 
domination is slavery, a right of property ; (ii) domination without destroying 
freedom is a right like property, but touches only one act : obligation. "... cet 
acte, soustrait au libre arbitre de cette personne, passe sous l'empire de notre 
volonté" 167. Property and obligation both extend the domination by our 
will, both are resolved into a sum of money of which we can transfer the 
property, both are focused upon enjoyment of property, both extend our 
power beyond natural limits. 
These relations which extend power are called, as a whole, biens. The 
Latin name of bona expresses only an accessory idea, the happiness resulting 
from this power ; their German name of Vermoegen expresses the essence of 
the chose, the extension of power, which rights make us obtain168. The 
"totality of relations" {biens) is an important idea in law, indispensible for its 
complete study. Its features are that : the goods have changing confines ; in 
order to be seen generally, they must be seen abstractly, i.e., as a "pure 
quantity of identical elements". Thus the abstract quantity of will's extension 
also includes its restraints, viz., debts169. 
The abstraction of goods into pure quantity is expressed in a "common 
denominator" : value. Value means money value ; this is how it is manifested, 
this is where its usefulness lies 17°. Under such a rubric, even the pure 
obligatio faciendi becomes property m . 
Finally, this unity of Vermoegen or patrimoine which goods have when 
totalized, abstracted, fungible and pecuniary is based upon the person of its 
possessor "2, i.e., the person as will. This description of patrimony, thus far 
highly reminiscent of the French authors', departs radically here, in that its 
basis in will means that artificial and arbitrary unities for specific ends are 
quite acceptable. Each is called a universitas juris, that is, a whole in 
opposition to its constitutive parts, with no distinctions among the qualitative 
differences of those parts. The term is not in use among the Roman jurists. 
Savigny warns, without explaining why, however, that though emptied of 
content each universality has special rules following from its own specificity, 
and "explicitly forbids" submission of all of them to the same set of rules m . 
167. Id, p. 333, no. 53. 
168. Id., no. 53, p. 334, and n.(b). 
169. Id., no. 56, pp. 370-371. 
170. Id, no. 56, p. 371, and n.(k). 
171. Ibid. 
172. Id, p. 372. 
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As examples, in Roman family law the content of the jural relation is 
not the absolute power of the head ; that power is only its natural character, 
as shown by the absence of any imperative law governing nor any action at 
law implementing this power "4. Instead, its content is "that placement 
which the individual's different relations give him" 175, "a rigorously deter-
mined mode of existence, independent of individual will and tied to the 
overall scheme of nature" 176, "the recognition and imposition of rules upon 
his conditions of existence" 177. 
As in Roman successions, the absence of rights to exercise does not 
exclude jural relation, for the law rigorously determines the conditions of 
life178. Thus, the son cannot acquire, because he assumes his father's 
personality to continue that life by the fiction of representing it, and thus 
already shares his father's goods; property is useless to him 179. In life the 
person is the substance, and the totality of goods his accident ; in death that 
totality is the substance and his personality their accident '80. By themselves, 
goods would disperse and lose legal meaning at death, because as an 
extension of the individual's power and thus an attribute of his personality, 
they also are temporary. But the property finds real existence within the 
State, which does not die and to which general organism the goods attach 
themselves without break. Therein they retain by a fiction their character as 
private property and continue to be dominated by the deceased's will, either 
by a testamentary document or by devolving upon those closest to him 181. 
The inheritance is a unity based in the person of the deceased. It is a 
pure quantity, abstracted from its elements' diversity. As such it it is known 
as a successio per universitatem, as known in Roman practice is not an 
abstract principle. Succession as action is a means to acquire the totality of 
rights which are the individual's goods, "l'ensemble des droits qui composent 
les biens d'un individu" ; succession as an object, the material of the action, 
is a distinctive right independent of any other, a universitas1*2. 
Roman donation has forms fitted only to individual things, not their 
totality as an ideal unity ; and it prohibits from any such unity the future 
goods, for that would be a disguised contract on succession which positive 
173. Id, p. 373, n.(n). 
174. Id, p. 342, no. 54. 
175. Id, p. 343. 
176. Id, p. 344. 
177. Id, p. 346. 
178. Id, p. 349. 
179. Id, p. 348, no. 54. 
180. Id, p. 379, no. 57. 
181. Id, pp. 375-376, no. 57. 
182. Id, pp. 378-379, no. 57. 
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law prohibits. The donor would be abandoning all control by will over his 
patrimoine ni. While this is permitted by German law's recognition of 
contracts on succession 184, the more interesting facet is the manner in which 
Savigny totalizes goods such that a like contract could be carried out. The 
object of gift is "l'universalité des biens, c'est-à-dire la totalité des droits 
dont ils se composent" 185, "l'universalité des biens, ... car on entend par là 
l'ensemble des droits appartenant à un individu" 186 ; "bona et res sont ici 
synonymes" 187. Quoting Paulus on his action for fraud, Savigny continues : 
'"universas res suas tradidif, c'est-à-dire les divers objets composant son 
patrimoine" 188. 
The patrimony of Savigny has many drastic differences from Zachariae's 
or Aubry and Rau's. Such are the total incoherence of any extrapatrimonial 
rights, the explicit assertion of a right of property over not only the 
patrimonial whole but over each of its contained elements such as obli-
gations, the identification of value much more forcefully with money value 
to the considerable downplaying of utility of a more general sort, the greatly 
lessened emphasis upon universality arising from the need for a common 
pledge to creditors. Despite these differences of detail, their bond is tight in 
view of the fundamental category of patrimony. It is a universality of goods, 
which can be universalized only because the rights upon them can be 
universalized. And these rights must be universalized because they attach to 
unique personhood. What makes the personhood unique and unified — 
individuum, undivided within and divided from all without — is the 
singleness of control (rights) over objects (goods). This single control is the 
exercise of unique will, the faculty of legal relevance. If not drawing from 
Savigny, Zachariae draws from the same pool. But it is more likely that he 
draws as an eminent lawyer from the eminent legal philosopher, Savigny. 
But the eminent legal philosopher himself draws from eminent philosophers, 
and as closer to the fountainhead is both more vigorous and more 
consequential. Who those eminent philosophers are, and what they had to 
draw from, must be the next phase of investigation. The research is not 
interminable, for it is nearing the breaking point between the ancients and 
the moderns. 
183. Id, IV, no. 159, pp. 139, 146-147. 
184. Id., p. 149. 
185. Id., p. 139. 
186. Id., p. 142. 
187. Id., n.(g). 
188. Id., no. 159, p. 144, n.(k); from L.17, no. 1; XLII, 8. 
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2.2.6. Eighteenth Century Legal Philosophy: Fichte and Kant 
Cairns says frankly that Savigny's discussion of legal relations seems to 
have been inspired directly by Fichte189. Not referring to Savigny's frequent 
footnotes to Fichte, Cairns bases his judgment on the similarity between the 
doctrine in passages cited above from Savigny's System to Fichte's Science190. 
For Fichte the basis of law is the ideal of jural relations. This relationship is 
the compulsion upon each individual to restrict his freedom in recognition of 
the possibility of the freedom of others '" . 
Man cannot be man unless he appears. We are constituted by the 
dialectic of Ego and Non-Ego, and the latter is the sensuous world. So the 
rights of free persons cannot exist at all unless they appear in the sensuous 
world, where they can be obstructed by others, i.e., unless they reciprocally 
limit each other. Man can be free only by being so recognized: 
But no free being can recognize the other as such unless both mutually thus 
recognize each other ; and no one can treat the other as a free being, unless 
both mutually thus treat each other. Hence the relationship between rational 
beings is a determined one, and is the legal relation. In essence, this is Fichte's 
deduction of the idea of legal relations."2 
Fichte's jural relation finds its model in Immanuel Kant's principle of rights, 
although its setting is methodologically different193. His definition of legal 
right is : "totality of conditions under which the will of one can be 
harmonized with the will of others according to a universal law of 
freedom" 194. Right is a relation of one's free action to the free action of 
another. Not its material object but only its freedom is taken into account ; 
and this freedom is mutually recognizable only when both actions are 
directed according to the universal law of reason195, viz., the categorical 
imperative. The categorical imperative is that norm of action which expresses 
the action of the will upon principles identified with its own nature in order 
to be good in itself, not upon the motive of some anticipated outcome of 
action. Only the will so acting can be judged good without qualification ; and 
189. J.-G. FICHTE, Grundlagen des Naturrechts nach den prinzipien des Wissenschaftslehren 
(1796), tr. A.E. KROEGER, The Science of Right, 1869. Since the following authors use the 
rhetoric of patrimony not at all, the liberty is taken of treating summarily and via 
secondary research only. 
190. The second volume is cited incorrectly, instead of the first. 
191. H. CAIRNS, supra, note 154, p. 470, from J.G. FICHTE, supra, note 189, pp. 81, 78. 
192. Id., p. 472. 
193. Kant provides Fichte not only his doctrine, but his influence past censorship: see 
F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, VII(l), Doubleday, 1963, p. 51. 
194. H. CAIRNS, supra, note 154, p. 399. 
195. Ibid. 
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only such action can relate us to the existence of the thing-in-itself which we 
lose in our rational knowledge. Yet the understanding's penchant to 
generalize affects the formulation of the categorical imperative : only if we 
can recognize all men to be free can we recognize ourselves to be so196. 
It would be possible to trace back this consummate importance of will 
in Kant into earlier modern sources ; that has often been done in historical 
studies. The important task here has been to root back the dynamics of 
patrimony into the mainstream of modern philosophy, onto its most basic 
assumptions. The remaining step must be not to rehearse its sequence but to 
find its outcome. As the setting of Roman law, without Savigny's doctrinal 
overlay, was the locus to find one alternative both to modern patrimony, and 
to the modern doctrine of will as the content of jus or rights, rights 
universalized into patrimony, now the movement of patrimony from the 
French code into the Quebec code remains to be studied. 
3. Civil Code of Quebec 
3.1. Legislation 
There is hardly any use of the term patrimoine in the present civil code. 
There are only three mentions in French "7. Two are concerned with the 
separation of patrimonies, once for successions at article 743 C.C. and again 
for gifts at article 802 C.C. This institution is taken as a matter of course 
from the continental French code, with more thought given to the function 
of separation than to the object separated, viz., patrimony. The absence of 
reflection and reform, unlike the draft, shows this fact. Neither of the two 
articles employs "patrimony", but only "property" which elsewhere in the 
code is biens. The only use of the term in both languages is in articles 2475 
196. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), often translated as Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, is the most accessible source for this doctrine. 
197. 743 C.C. Les créanciers du défunt et ses légataires ont droit à la séparation de son 
patrimoine d'avec celui des héritiers et légataires universels, ou à titre universel, à moins 
qu'il n'y ait novation... (The creditors of the deceased and his legatees have a right to a 
separation of the property of the succession from that of the heirs and universal legatees, 
or legatees under general title, unless there is novation...) 802 C.C. Les créanciers du 
donateur ont droit à la séparation de son patrimoine d'avec celui du donataire, dans les 
cas où celui-ci est tenu de la dette, suivant les règles sur la séparation de patrimoines en 
matière de successions, exposées au titre précédent (The creditors of the donor have a right 
to demand the separation of his property from that of the donee, whenever the latter is 
liable for the debt, according to the rules laid down in the preceding title as to such 
separation in matters of succession). 2475 C.C. L'assurance de dommages garantit l'assuré 
contre les conséquences d'un événement pouvant porter atteinte à son patrimoine (... 
adversely affect his patrimony). 
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C.C. defining damage insurance; and this is uncharacteristic of the code, 
having been introduced in the draft code's phrasing only three years before 
the draft code's final completion, and thus more part of the draft than of the 
Civil Code. 
3.2. Doctrine 
3.2.1. Mid-Nineteenth Century: 
Code Commission and Precodification 
No more than for the French codifiers is patrimony a driving concept 
for the Civil Code Commissioners. Through their three volumes of final 
reports, there are only a half-dozen mentions of the term at all, all but one 
in the fifth report on "Successions and Gifts", always in French with the 
English term remaining "property", and there concerned either with the 
seperation of patrimonies or, more fruitful conceptually, with the indis-
tinction of goods inherited. 
The first instance concerns the "division" of the deceased's patrimony 
from that of the heir "8. Commentary on draft article 145 makes a point of 
rejecting the "arbitrary and new" articles of the Code Napoléon on issue, in 
order to ensure greater freedom to Quebec heirs in disposing of the 
inheritance. Separation is proper where it is possible and useful ; but it is not 
useful where a debt in the succession has been novated. Nor should it keep 
the heir from administering the succession in good faith and intelligently, 
and often necessitously. As well, instead of the French short limitation on 
separation of moveables and its removal of a limitation for separation of 
immoveables in possession though not on their unpaid price, the Quebec 
article's commentary finds that all inherited goods secure debts on them 
until alienated or while price is due ; but once received and mixed, the heir is 
free. This approach has the same tenor as draft article 146 according to 
which separation of patrimoine/propeity cannot be sought by the heir's own 
creditors ; for, as in Roman and customary law, the heir cannot be kept from 
contracting new debts. It is also consistent with draft article 144 which, 
rejecting the Code Napoléon innovation again where it makes debts which 
were executory against the deceased executory de piano against the heir, 
instead requires a declaration that they are executory against the heir ; and 
this approach is taken in explicit awareness of its inconsistency with the 
maxim that le mort saisit le vif. Through each of these, the Quebec emphasis 
upon freeing the heir, mingling the goods and, by implication, thus 
198. COMMISSION FOR CODIFICATION OF LAWS RELATING TO CIVIL MATTERS, Report, Quebec, 
Desbarats, 1865, II, pp. 144-147. 
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diminishing the integrity or universality of the succession takes pride in 
running counter to Revolutionary law and developing according to Roman 
and customary law. 
On the other hand, the commissioners are quite willing to make their 
own droit nouveau by introducing separation of patrimoines/croptxty 
regarding gifts, and to do so in order to tip toward protection of creditors 
rather than freedom of donees '" . As their reason for introducing succession's 
rule here, the commissioners say that creditors' interest prevails and they 
should not be burdened with having to take paulian action to recover 
improper dispositions. The net effect seems to be that a drastic difference 
attains between patrimonies during life and after death200. Similarly the 
Code Napoleon's rules are applied to that other separation of debts, not 
patrimonies, which can be contracted between intending spouses201. Article 
137 permits one to avoid liability for his partner's prior debts and thus, in 
effect if not in so many words, separate their patrimonies. But this effect is 
achieved only if inventory is made ; otherwise, creditors can ignore the clause 
of separation. Here the maxim "bona non intelliguntur nisi deducto aere 
alieno" has full scope, in article 138, though once the fruits of the separate 
patrimony are enjoyed by the community the expenses attached to the fruits 
burden spouses' own patrimony, by article 139. 
The final separation of patrimonies discussed occurs between institute 
and substitute of a substitution202. While the property in the substitution is 
mixed with what is otherwise the institute's own, this mix is temporary and 
is defeated as to debts between institute and substitute. This is explicitly 
related back by its rationale to the paradigm case of successions : in respect 
of an institute's claim against a substitute, the institute is free to exercise the 
claim because he holds the property by will of the testator, while the 
substitute takes the role of an heir. 
The second prominent use of the terminology of patrimony is found in 
the characterization of the inheritance203. Following the Code Napoleon's 
article 732, Justinian's Novels 118 and 127, and the modifications introduced 
years before by the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada, the commis-
sioners end the complex rules of the Custom of Paris de biens et de 
patrimoines "of property and inheritances", whereby different kinds of 
property went to different classes of people. Now, "chaque individu était 
199. Id., pp. 160-161, a.52. 
200. Nonetheless, seisin is given of gifts de piano, as in Ancien droit and contrary to the Code 
Napoléon: id., pp. 150-151. 
201. Id., pp. 230-231. 
202. Id., pp. 196-197, aa.219-220. 
203. Id., pp. 110-113. 
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regardé comme ne possédant qu'un seul patrimoine/... but one inheritance" ; 
"tous ensemble ils [c.-à-d., les biens] ne forment qu'un seul patrimoine/... 
inheritance", "un seul et unique patrimoine/... inheritance". Several items in 
this exposition deserve note. First, resort to the term "inheritance" to 
express patrimoine is demanded by the need to use the term "property", the 
usual counterpart for patrimoine in the commissioners' report, as the 
counterpart of biens; "inheritance" is usually expressed by succession. 
Inheritance is only one sort or stage of patrimony and is a less accurate 
meaning than the "property" which is also used to express biens; it is 
difficult to explain the tortuous avoidance of the English term, "patri-
mony". Next, the Code Napoléon is followed only in part ; for its excessive 
logic is not followed, of replacing the principle of different goods to different 
people by the equally unbending principle of goods all indiscriminately to 
but one person, viz., the nearest relative. Some of the prudence of the 
Customs survives. Finally, the French code — and its commentary — is not 
the precedent even for this less ambitious principle. For the commissioners' 
report of 1865 explicitly derives its article from the Consolidated Statutes for 
Lower Canada, c.34, of 1861. In turn, however, this chapter entitled An Act 
respecting divers Personal Rights is not a single piece of legislation but instead 
a rationalized reordering of bits and pieces from a hodgepodge of earlier 
statutes. The relevant bit to the commissioners is article 2(1) ; and this article 
has noted as its regnal year 41 G.III, that is, 1801 — or three years before the 
Code Napoléon was legislated. Although it deals with the distinctively French 
institutions of propres, acquets and conquets, remaining untranslated in the 
English version, the diction of the remainder is distinctly of English origin, 
e.g., the term "estates" in subsection 2(3); and, while the history of the 
salons is another story, this was not a period of history when English public 
institutions were imitating the French. In fact, as appears in Mayrand's brief 
reference to this Act of 1801 for a different purpose204, its intent was to 
reinforce the English institution of testamentary freedom introduced into 
Quebec by the predecessor Quebec Act of 1774205. The upshot of this 
historical note is that a seeming dependence of the Quebec civil law upon the 
French regarding a policy whose purpose appears to go a long way towards 
defining patrimony, is not such at all. 
The only other use of the term patrimoine is in the third report, on 
property, while explaining the distinctions used therein206. Biens are not 
204. A. MAYRAND, supra, note 34, p. 889. 
205. The same is implied by the preamble written continuously into the provisions in its 
original format under the title An Act to explain and amend the Law respecting Last Wills 
and Testaments, collected in the Revised Acts and Ordinances of Lower Canada, 1845. 
206. Supra, note 198, I, pp. 562-563, a.374. 
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choses ; the latter is a wider expression, and means "whatever could be of any 
usefulness to a man, although he does not possess it", while the former is 
narrower and means "whatever he possesses and which fait partie du 
patrimoine". Choses are whatever he can use ; biens are whatever he possesses 
in fact. Beyond this non-committal usage, biens consistently means 
"property" in the various reports. While at one point biens are integrated 
and universalized — biens vacants are "estates which are vacant"207, usually 
they are not. The difference, indeed, between universal title and general title 
is always kept, as regarding legatees208 and donees209, and abridged only 
once, as regards usufructuaries who, in both languages, are also known as 
universal even though they may claim for a portion or percentage only210. 
Also, a universality appears in the description of succession ("inheritance") 
as "la transmission des biens, droits et charges" and of hérédité ("inheri-
tance") as "l'universalité des biens, droits et charges" ("property, rights and 
liabilities")211. The transmission is a universality ; or it is the transmission of 
a universality. The sense is not developed, however ; nor is it elsewhere, in 
accord with the principle in the preface to the Reports of offering no 
definitions, unlike the Code Napoléon212. Nonetheless, what is striking is the 
absence of any reference to the writing of Aubry and Rau throughout, and 
especially in the second report on person, the third on property and the fifth 
on successions. If there had been consciousness or intent of grounding the 
code in a theory of patrimony, this omission would have been unthinkable, 
less than thirty years after those authors had turned French doctrine around. 
If no theory of patrimony stands out, it is no surprise that no theory of 
extrapatrimoniality is visible either. But its trace is provocative, as left in the 
commissionners' dispute recorded over disinterment, which is still a locus 
classicus for the issue of extrapatrimoniality to arise. The majority position 
in the second report on persons is that the provisions regarding disinterment 
are not police regulations213. But reference is made to their disagreement 
with a minority consisting of Commissioner Day, whose opinion is expressed 
in a separate report that the provisions regarding disinterment are only 
police regulations because they impose penalties214. What is unsure is where 
what is now alleged to be the extrapatrimoniality of the body is to be found : 
in the minority position that it lies beyond substantive civil law? Or in the 
207. Id., I, pp. 366-367. 
208. Id., II, pp. 142-143. 
209. Id., II, pp. 156-157. 
210. Id., I, pp. 378-379. 
211. Id, II, pp. 108-109. 
212. Id., I, pp. 10-11, para. 1. 
213. Id, pp. 160-161. 
214. Id, pp. 238-239. 
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majority stand that it is profoundly rooted rather than just legal, as Day's 
"only" might imply? 
3.2.2. Late Nineteenth Century: Mignault 
Mignault has no treatment of patrimony, and makes use of the term not 
at all in successions and only twice in property. What defines biens as such is 
that they are choses capable of entering the patrimony. Choses are everything 
which exists. Biens are a species of choses, those which are capable of being 
appropriated to a person to the exclusion of other men, those which 
contribute to human happiness by their moral or material usefulness, 
following Ulpian's etymology at L.49 of the Digest — all except the most 
useful (air, light, stars) which being destined by their nature to the use of all 
cannot by anyone's exclusively2'5. 
A right is a faculty given to a person to do or to demand something. The 
right of property (the faculty given a person to take from something all the 
usefulness it offers) is a real right (the faculty given a person to take all or 
part of the usefulness of something, to the exclusion of all others): 
immediate, acquired and present upon its object, rather than a title to arrive 
via intermediaries at a real right in the future. To it corresponds a general 
and negative obligation whose debtor is not a person but a chose, personified 
by fiction of law216. 
With but a passing use of the term patrimoine211, Mignault recommences 
later a discussion of what would have been the contents of patrimony, had 
the category been of the slightest interest to him. Corporeals are things with 
real bodies, seizable by the senses; incorporeals are things without body 
and graspable only by intellects, such as are rights, which form the class of 
incorporeal things218. But not all rights are incorporeals: only personal 
rights are, and dismemberments of the right of property; the right of 
property itself is a bien corporel. Rationally this is unexplainable : the right of 
property, too, is an insensible abstraction as are other rights. But historically 
215. Droit civil canadien, II, Montréal, Théoret, 1896, pp. 388-389. 
216. Id., pp. 389-390, and p. 391, n.l, in doctrine drawn from Ortolan and Démangeât, the 
sources also of his doctrine of personality in v.I, Montreal, Wilson and Lafleur, 1895, p. 9, 
n. 1, as well as of the wider development of this point by S. GINOSSAR, Droit réel, propriété 
et créance ; élaboration d'un système des droits patrimoniaux, Paris, Librairie générale de 
droit et de jurisprudence, 1960. 
217. P.-B. MIGNAULT, supra, note 215, II, p. 394. 
218. The basis noted is Justinian's Institutes, 2 de reb. incörp., II, ii, that "incorporates sunt 
quae tangi non posSunt; qualia sunt ea quae in jure consistant" — which supports 
Mignault only if jus is a faculty in the sense Mignault has previously defined right. 
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it subjects the chose so fully to the owner that the droit is identified with its 
objet; the Romans' speech, as ours, says not "I have got the right of property 
over this thing, the property of this thing belongs to me", but says "I have 
got this thing, this thing belongs to me" 2 " . Such exceptional standing is 
paralleled by the even more exceptional fact that, since no thing is permitted 
not to have an owner, it is not incorrect to say that "la propriété, au concret, 
est d'ordre public" 22°, the feature Baudouin will find distinctive of extra-
patrimonial rights, a term not used by Mignault at all. 
Summarizing these results, Mignault feels able to explain droits sur des 
biens in a way counter to the intent of the law but in accord with its deeper 
drive. When the code names the rights over biens, or real rights, at article 405 
C.C., it obviously intends biens to mean corporeal things, says Mignault. But 
rights, that is, incorporeals, can also be biens. So they can be the object of 
another right, he says citing 453 C.C. and offering as example a right of 
usufruct upon a right of usufruct. Even if, then, the sole rights on biens are 
those enumerated below the preceding in 405 C.C.221, there seems nothing 
eccentric about a right of property upon right of usufruct, or indeed upon a 
right or property. But it is just this which Mignault disavowed nearly thirty 
years later as judge in Duchaine c. Matamajaw Salmon Club222, on the basis 
that a right to fish in another's river cannot be a right of property in the form 
of a profit à prendre, because it gives no title to the riverbed, but is only a 
right of usufruct. His policy reason may be convincing or not, that such 
splintering beyond the real dismemberments allowed by the code's numerous 
clausus would reduce the bare ownership to an entity of no commercial value 
but only a burden once all benefits were sold off. And his righteousness 
against the adulteration of the civilian law may be admirable223. But his legal 
reason seems beside the point : the right of property may be established upon 
that bien which is the right of usufruct, without breaking the closed 
categories but while reaching the same result. The correspondent to this 
appeared when the classical theory was described in terms of a right of 
219. P.-B. MIGNAULT, supra, note 215, II, p. 395. 
220. Id., p. 477. 
221. Id., p. 464. 
222. (1922) 58 S.C.R. 222, 246. 
223. It is an impoverishment of civilian property law that this provinciality is all for which 
Matamajaw is remembered, by Caste] and by Baudouin, which with the two "Trudel" 
references above are the sole mentions of the case discoverable from Index Gagnon. Cf. : 
J.-G. CASTEL, "Le juge Mignault défenseur de l'intégrité du droit civil québécois", (1975) 
53 Can. Bar Rev. 544, p. 547 ; J.-L. BAUDOUIN, "L'interprétation du Code civil québécois 
par la Cour suprême du Canada", (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev., 715, p. 726, n.30. 
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property upon the patrimony, that is, upon the real and personal rights that 
are pecuniary, or upon the corresponding goods that are their objects224. 
3.2.3. Mid-Twentieth Century: Trudel 
The lack of attention to patrimony is not of recent occurrence. Marler's 
book makes no mention of it at all225. The Traité de droit civil du Québec 
edited by Trudel goes only slightly further. Faribault writes the only passage 
of relevance in accepting without comment the Privy Council's decision in 
Matamajaw that there is a right of property, and not just a right of enjoyment 
or a dismemberment, over a fishing right ; seemingly without noticing the 
difference of this phrasing from the Banc du rofs decision for the same party, 
that there is a right of property over the riverbed, although this difference 
between objects is crucial to the structure of patrimony226. Montpetit and 
Taillefer labour to the same acceptance, even forming a principle that "on 
peut créer tous les démembrements imaginables du droit du propriété non 
défendus par la loi", but only on the Banc du roi's decision of copropriété du 
lit221. Somehow this is presumed equivalent to the principle that "il n'y a de 
droits réels que ceux qui sont déclarés tels par la loi". Among these, "la 
propriété constitue un droit sur sa propre chose"228. The chose, however, is 
relevant to law only so far as it is propre, that is "capable of being 
appropriated", for things themselves are "hors de son contrôle"229. As such 
they are the elements of patrimony, biens, namely, "les choses pouvant faire 
l'objet d'un droit et représentant une valeur pécuniaire" as the classical 
French writers Colin and Capitant are cited to define it. As such, rights also 
are biens, and thus enter patrimony, since they too can be appropriated or 
possessed. Patrimony is "l'ensemble des droits ou biens et des charges d'une 
personne appréciables en argent, envisagés comme une universalité de droit". 
When the authors say that "notre théorie du patrimoine vient de notre 
224. If doctrine is not concerned with patrimonial rights as such, it is no wonder that caselaw 
should be even less so, and that its categories as well as its extrapatrimonial counterparts 
should be entirely absent from the Repertoire, its three Supplements, and the Annuaire de 
jurisprudence, both as such and even as a title under "Propriété" or "Successions". It is 
shocking to discover, however, that even the concept of rights as droits subjectifs, which is 
a precondition to the former consideration, is itself totally absent until this decade, when 
first appear titles of "Droits civils", in 1971, "Droits de l'homme" in 1972, and "Droits de 
la personne" in 1974. 
225. W. de M. MARLER, The Law of Real Property, Toronto, Burroughs, 1932. 
226. T. IV by L. FARIBAULT, Montreal, Wilson and Lafleur, 1954, p. 60. 
227. T. Ill by A. MONTPETIT and G. TAILLEFER, Montreal, Wilson and Lafleur, 1945, p. 101. 
228. Id., p. 18. 
229. Id., p. 15. 
128 Les Cahiers de Droit (1981) 22 c. de D. 81 
théorie de la personnalité... Le patrimoine, c'est l'expression de la person-
nalité juridique en matière des biens", it is unsure whether they are speaking 
for themselves or for Quebec in saying "our" 23°. In fact the theory is entirely 
classical : only persons have patrimony ; every person does ; he has only one, 
une masse unique ; it is inseparable in life, it is his succession in death. Some 
rights are not estimable in money, and fall extrapatrimonially ; these are the 
rights of personality, including political rights and rights attached to 
status231. So, while biens form the patrimony, some rights are not in 
patrimony, although rights can be biens if appropriatable. 
3.2.4. Late Twentieth Century : Baudouin 
The taciturn code is mirrored by the silence of its doctrine, making all 
the more striking the blossoming of the concept in the draft code. Even 
recently, patrimony functions as only a foil against which to define other 
concepts; neuter itself, it allows for their identity. Thus Pineau uses 
patrimony to distinguish capacities from powers; the former refer to the 
person, the latter to goods the person acts upon, "non seulement sur son 
patrimoine, mais encore sur le patrimoine d'autrui"232. Mayrand defines 
seizin in terms which employ the concept of patrimony, but there it is a non-
committal operator used to distinguish possession from property233. Even the 
prominence given to patrimony by Castelli's study of the movement from 
patrimony as a function of blood relationship (lignagère), through its 
individual attachment, to a destination conjugale is deceptive. For the 
concept is of importance only insofar as patrimony is held by such and such 
differing parties, not insofar as its structure or contents are either changed or 
studied; "c'est dans la mesure où le patrimoine est devenu celui d'une 
personne plus que d'une famille que le conjoint a cessé d'être étranger"234. 
The striking exception to this is Beaudoin's profound and sustained 
reliance upon the notion of patrimony to explain obligations. Cette notion 
extrêmement importante is first defined at length, then is used indirectly in 
giving exposition of the extrapatrimonial rights Baudouin appeals to 
throughout, and finally serves directly as the rationale of several institutions 
of civil law. 
230. Id., p. 16. 
231. Id., p. 17. 
232. J. PINEAU, La famille, Montreal, P.U.M., 1972, p. 198, no. 220. 
233. A. MAYRAND, Les successions ab intestat, Montreal, P.U.M., 1971, no. 45, as reported by 
J. ROY, "Transmission successorale: saisine, envoi en possession, faculté d'accepter, de 
refuser ou d'accepter sous bénéfice d'inventaire en droit québécois", (1972) 26 Rev. jur. et 
pol. Ind. et coop. 899, p. 900. 
234. M. D. CASTELLI, "L'évolution du droit successoral en France et au Québec", (1973) 14 C. 
de D. 411, p. 467. 
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The comparative character of patrimonial and extrapatrimonial rights 
in Baudouin's exposition can best be expressed schematically235. 
droits extrapatrimoniaux droits patrimoniaux 
possessed by physical person ...or moral 
attached to person do not depend on personality : any-
one can have them ; 
die with person do not die with him : are part of 
patrimony ; 
imprescriptible prescriptible and transmissible: for 
one survives par son patrimoine ; 
not estimable in money estimable in money : "Le patrimoine 
est avant tout une notion écono-
mique." ; 
conferred by law: because of one's arise from economic activity. 
place in society. 
The rationale of extrapatrimonial rights is of interest, to see which charac-
teristic conditions which other236. (1) They have no pecuniary value, so they 
have no market value, and therefore cannot be sold. (2) They are hors 
commerce, because their cession is against public order, since it is exclusively 
the law which creates them and determines the holder. (3) They are 
unseizable, since they have no material situs and serve no economic needs, 
and thus are open to all regardless of material position. The absence of 
market value in (1) is a natural fact, and so may or may not be the case ; it 
appears that founding this upon a failure of pecuniary value is intended to 
redefine the market as an affair of principle. This is explicit in (2), where 
their extrapatrimoniality is acknowledged to be an affair of legal concoction. 
Thus follows the absence of material situs and distance from economic needs 
in (3), which at first glance appears to have again a factual root, but can as 
well be grasped as a matter of legal fiction. It is not surprising that its 
consequence, extrapatrimonial rights' openness to all, should be ill-distin-
guished from the openness to all of patrimonial rights which stems from 
their detachment from personality. This positioning of patrimony as opposed 
to extrapatrimoniality, on the ground that the first is irrespective of person 
and the latter is integral to person, is strikingly contrary to the concept of 
patrimony in classical tradition. 
Baudouin excludes from oblique action the "droits exclusivement 
attachés à la personne du débiteur"237. It is lest the creditor control the 
235. J.-L. BAUDOUIN, Les obligations, Montreal, P.U.M., 1970, p. 7, nos. 8-9. 
236. Id., p. 8, no. 8. 
237. Id., p. 239, no. 447. 
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debtor's family life and status contrary to his will that extrapatrimonial 
rights and rights which would substantially increase the assets of the 
patrimony are excluded from oblique action. Also excluded are rights 
involving the debtor's moral interest ; but Baudouin questions the inclusion 
among these of damages for delicts relating to goods of body, since their 
purpose is partly to restore earnings whose loss diminishes the solidité of 
one's patrimony. One is at the point of crossover, where his arrangement of 
the whole distinction as one between types rather than among degrees 
becomes less believable. 
Patrimony serves Baudouin as the explanatory tool for many insti-
tutions. Extinction of confusion operates only when, in a succession, 
acceptance is made without benefit, "qui n'emporte pas la confusion des 
deux patrimoines"238. In stipulation for a third party, the beneficiary's claim 
in newly created and has never been part of the stipulator's patrimony; 
instead, it exists in the beneficiary's patrimony from the moment the contract 
is concluded. Thus, his acceptance does not create the right but only confirms 
it ; so the stipulator no longer is able to withdraw from his obligation, even 
though the beneficiary may not yet have accepted239. Again, in enrichment 
without cause, Baudouin accepts as the basis for action not the theories of a 
quasi-contractual supplement to negotiorum gestio nor a quasi-delictual civil 
responsibility, but "la théorie dite de la transmission de valeurs ou de 
l'équilibre des patrimoines". This "independent, autonomous institution" 
consists of making a value reenter the patrimony whence it was lifted when it 
entered the other's patrimony240. It is highly significant that Baudouin's 
attachment to this theory, along with Morel, Mayrand and the Mignault of 
Regent Taxi rather than the textbook Mignault, is coupled to the recognition 
that Aubry and Rau were the first to defend it from their first edition 
onwards241. For Aubry and Rau were the fathers of the classical theory of 
patrimony whose acceptance becomes a matter of course and only infre-
quently acknowledged, as here. Baudouin, true to his earlier distinction, 
refuses to recognize such enrichment of patrimony when the gain is purely 
moral; for such is not a "transmission of values" between two patri-
monies242. 
Above all, Baudouin's treatment of oblique and paulian actions, 
integrated into a droit de surveillance du patrimoine, is couched on this 
explanatory tool. Because patrimony rather than the debtor's person is 
238. Id., p. 371, no. 690. 
239. Id., pp. 176-177, no. 330. 
240. Id., p. 215, no. 411; p. 218, no. 417. 
241. Ibid., citing their Cours..., lre éd., Paris, Marchai, 1939, IV, p. 106. 
242. J.-L. BAUDOUIN, supra, note 235, p. 219, no. 417. 
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creditors' common pledge, they can oversee it, "pour assurer la conservation 
du patrimoine", and guarantee against "une dilapidation ou un affaiblis-
sement du contenu du patrimoine"243. Patrimony and contents are one and 
the same here. Further, as in the draft code's commentary, the claim must be 
shown to be prior to the disposition being attacked ; for it is the patrimony at 
the moment of the claim which is the common pledge244. Finally, the 
disposition which is attacked is unopposable only against the suing creditor, 
not against all creditors, in paulian action unlike oblique action. This 
"classic theory" is explained as follows, all in terms of patrimony : the good 
pursued does not return to the debtor's patrimony, where it might have been 
accessible to all creditors again ; instead it remains in the patrimony of the 
third party who has received it245 ; for this third can pay off the creditor, so 
as to keep that good intact dans son patrimoine2*6. 
4. Quebec draft civil code 
4.1. Legislation 
The draft code offers nearly two dozen articles in which the term 
patrimoine is employed, a much stronger presence than formerly. Some are 
traditional uses where the term is but a marker for a vague reference left 
unpenetrated ; but other uses are reflective innovations in civilian tradition. 
Among the most innovative is the insertion of the term "patrimony" into 
the legal vocabulary of the English language for the first time in any 
legislative text. 
Nearly as drastic as the refounding of legal language is the announ-
cement in article 1-4: 
Toute personne est titulaire d'un patrimoine composé de l'universalité de ses 
biens et de ses dettes. 
Elle est aussi titulaire des droits et devoirs extra-patrimoniaux propres à son 
état. 
(Every person has a patrimony which consists of all his property and all his 
debts. 
He also possesses the extra-patrimonial rights and duties peculiar to his status). 
This is supposedly no innovation, only making explicit what was always 
understood in the civilian law. But explicitation is extremely important when 
243. Id., p. 233, no. 437, my stress. 
244. Id., p. 244, no. 457. 
245. Id., p. 253, no. 471. 
246. Id., p. 253, no. 473. 
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what was implicit was hotly disputed and, in some respects, vague. In such 
circumstances this can only be taking sides, giving a definition and the 
manner-and-form of proper discussion of the issues, cutting off the alter-
natives ; there can be no neutrality in the deed247. 
This judgment is borne out by examination of the text, especially the 
first paragraph. While the English text is studded with the key term, it is not 
laced with the theory behind it, as is the French text. If "having" a 
patrimony and "all" his "property" is relatively bland, the French terms 
have fully another flavour. Being a titulaire is considerably stronger than 
being a "haver", for it approximates the position of a proprietor who here 
would have a right, the right of property in that patrimony. Patrimony is an 
object of property. Also, there is no accident in the use of l'universalité to 
state what the content of such patrimony is, for that term is the root of 
contention in previous theory : whether patrimony is a unit, or is a bundle. 
Having opted for the former, the draft code is inconsistent in the use of 
composé to express how the biens and dettes make up that universality ; for as 
a unit it is uncomposed, and from this flows its classical features. Bold as the 
definition here is, it hedges one theory by another. While it remains to be 
seen just what the biens are of which the patrimony is composed — although 
they are already identified as "property" in which alone the patrimoine is 
elsewhere stated in English to consist — the draft code's option for assets-
minus-liabilities remains in the mainstream French tradition under the 
Roman slogan that nulla bona nisi aere alieno deducto, as distinct from the 
German tradition and a minority French tradition. 
The second paragraph manifests a striking attempt to maintain a 
parallel to the first, presumably to take advantage of its doctrinal exposition. 
What universal patrimony is to person as regards his property and debts, 
extrapatrimoniality by status is to person as regards other persons. Here 
again — this time in both legislative languages — is the adoption of a new 
concept into civilian legislation, one presumably clear from civilian doctrine ; 
yet definitionally it is a function of the notion of patrimony, a residue. Yet 
the parallelism cannot be complete, for these rights and duties are not a 
universality, both because a huge subtraction has already been made from 
their totality for patrimony, and because status has one of the cohesive force 
of patrimony. This is so whether status is understood as one's concrete legal 
position, from whose confines some general extrapatrimonial rights spill 
over, or in the weakened sense of the commentary at this point, which suffers 
the same overflow. And least of all is there any extrapatrimonial unity 
247. Compare the absence of any such vocabulary in the Quebec Charier of Human Rights's 
parallel dispositions. 
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arising from an analogous setoff between its rights and duties, as there is 
between patrimonial goods and debts. Extrapatrimohial rights do not form a 
whole subject to deduction of another whole in a strictly fungible fashion, an 
accountant's unity, but each extrapatrimonial right stands independently. 
Nor is any single right determined first and then subject to deduction from 
without, since moral limitations are part of the very concept of rights. As 
well, each single right is not conditioned by each single duty, in the way that 
each debt conditions each asset ; rather, the limitations inherent in one right 
may be and usually are simply irrelevant to the definition of each other right 
in the extrapatrimonial order. While it is not the intent to criticize here, it is 
necessary to point out that patrimony is set in formal parallel to extra-
patrimonial rights despite their conceptual assymetry. Again the innovation 
is striking. 
The other two uses of patrimoine in the first book are also innovations 
in each language, though less drastic in meaning248. Regarding tutorship, 
article 1-125 again distinguishes patrimony from person, although finding 
them not incompatible responsibilities for a tutor; while article 1-133, in 
addition to again distinguishing patrimony from person (although the status 
with which person is identified seems to mean something different than it did 
in article 1-4), differentiates patrimony also from the biens ("property") 
which make it up. Harming the patrimony and harming a sizeable portion of 
one's goods or property are two different harms. 
In the second book on family under the section dealing with the 
matrimonial regime of partnership of acquests, some four articles employ 
the term patrimoine in prescribing the rules for dissolving that regime, 
particularly the accounting between the private property and the acquests249. 
248. 1-125. La tutelle est destinée à assurer la protection de la personne et du patrimoine, ou du 
patrimoine seulement (Tutorship is intended to ensure protection of the person and of the 
patrimony, or of the patrimony only). 1-133. Ne peut être tuteur : ... 3. celui qui a ou dont 
le conjoint a, avec la personne protégée, un litige dans lequel l'état de cette personne, son 
patrimoine ou une partie notable de ses biens sont compromis (... status, patrimony, or a 
significant portion of the property...). 
249. 11-105. Sur acceptation des acquêts d'un conjoint, on forme d'abord deux masses des biens 
du patrimoine de ce dernier, l'une constituée des propres, l'autre des acquêts (When a 
consort's acquests are accepted, the property of his patrimony must first be divided into 
two masses, one comprising the private property and the other the acquests). II-l 12. Si le 
compte accuse un solde en faveur de la masse des acquêts, l'époux titulaire du patrimoine 
en fait rapport à cette masse partageable, soit en moins prenant, soit en valeur, soit à même 
les propres... (ïf the statement shows a balance in favour of the mass of acquests, the 
consort who holds the patrimony makes a return to the mass for partition, either by taking 
less, or in value, or from his private property...). 11-113. Le règlement des récompenses 
achevé, la masse des acquêts de l'époux titulaire du patrimoine est soumise à partage par 
moitié avec le conjoint, suivant les règles de ce Code sur le partage, à moins que l'époux 
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It is novel in both languages to describe the regime in these terms. The role of 
patrimony is, first, to rémain whole so that all creditors may be satisfied: 
neither spouse is entitled to his share in the other's patrimony until the other 
has taken care of his debts, by article 11-115. Article 11-113 then envisages the 
accounting within that patrimony taking place while the patrimony rests in 
the hands either of a spouse who is entitled to it, titulaire, or out of his hands 
and administered by another. That is, it is detachable from a person, in its 
entirety ; it is rather something he "holds". Also, some piercing of the veil of 
indiscernability which hides the particular character of goods in the patri-
mony serving to secure the creditor is envisaged: the other spouse can seek 
for his share to be given in kind, not currency. 
Article 11-105 locates two masses in the patrimonial whole, made up 
each of goods qualified differently but both within the whole, each a small 
patrimony in that it is an accounting of goods against debts of its own as 
described in article 1-4; 11-112 tells how to carry out that accounting, in 
order to derive a whole fit to be divided in half-shares of which one shall 
enter the other's patrimony. From finish to start of this cluster of articles, 
then, there is a movement from a whole, to its displacement, and then to its 
divisibility by natural kind and finally by legal type. 
Book Three, on "Successions", contains a seventh chapter traditional in 
that here alone was the term patrimoine used in earlier codes. In the final 
articles of the chapter on "Liabilities of the Succession and Separation of 
Patrimonies" ("Du passif de la succession et de la séparation des patri-
moines"), the draft follows one of the civilian practices which had led 
commentators to doubt the unity of patrimony, that is, it keeps separate the 
debts and liabilities of the deceased from the debts and liabilities of the heir ; 
the heir holds both, having indeed inherited the deceased's patrimony, but he 
holds them separately, one as his own and one as the deceased's. The 
deceased's creditors, however, no longer need demand this under article 
III-18125°; the separation is now part of the legal characterization of patri-
titulaire de ce patrimoine ne préfère désintéresser le conjoint pour la totalité ou pour une 
part de ce qui lui revient en lui en payant la valeur. Toutefois, si la dissolution du régime 
résulte du décès ou de l'absence de l'époux titulaire du patrimoine, son conjoint peut 
exiger que l'on place dans son lot, moyenant soulte, s'il y a lieu, la résidence familiale et les 
meubles de ménage, ainsi que tout autre bien faisant partie de la masse à partager... (...of 
the consort who holds the patrimony). 11-115. La dissolution du régime ne peut 
préjudicier, avant le partage, au recours des créanciers antérieurs sur l'intégralité du 
patrimoine de leur débiteur... (Dissolution of the regime cannot prejudice the recourse, 
before the partition, of former creditors against all of their debtor's patrimony). 
250. III-181. La séparation entre le patrimoine du défunt et celui de l'héritier a toujours lieu, 
sans qu'il faille la demander... (The patrimony of the deceased is always separated from 
that of the heir without separation being applied for...) 
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mony, rather than an accidental feature which might be added at creditor's 
behest. As well, it is essential to patrimony in that a creditor may always 
invoke it, under article III-183 ; nor is there a time limit, as though an heir's 
holding of two patrimonies separately is eccentric or exceptional. The heir 
owns the items in the patrimonies, both his own and those which were the 
deceased's; he "owns" the "property", he has propriété in the biens2i[. But 
this assimilation of ownerships works no assimilation of patrimonies, which 
remain accountable only for each its own debts. 
Beyond the confines ofthat chapter, separation occurs by article III-321 
as much under a will as it did without one, not surprisingly since there it is even 
more conceivable that a testator would seek to benefit a beloved legatee by 
relieving him of his creditors, while leaving unsatisfied the testator's own 
creditors. But the latter is always benefitted, under III-322. Similarly, 
separation of patrimonies occurs by law alone, according to article III-399, 
in a substitution as in the other articles of this cluster252. The institute may 
have had claims against the grantor, or have spent his resources to preserve 
the substitution for the substitute. Lest his claims be displaced by the 
substitute's creditors and their claims upon the substitution once assimilated 
into the substitute's patrimony, that substitution remains separate. It was 
(part of) the grantor's patrimony ; it first became separated therefrom ; it 
then became confused with the institute's patrimony ; but it later became a 
separate patrimony from that, at termination ; finally, its goods became 
owned by the substitute while its liabilities remained separate, that is, it 
remained a separate patrimony from his own in the hands of the substitute, 
and this forever. This patrimony lives a life of its own, at times losing its 
outlines in another patrimony, then regaining them. It is not the case, 
however, that claims in the institute's patrimony against assets in the 
substitute's patrimony, as separate from the patrimony of the substitution, 
can be realized against assets in the patrimony of the substitution. The 
251. III-183. Le droit à la séparation des patrimoines s'exerce sur les biens tant qu'ils 
demeurent la propriété de l'héritier ou sur le prix de l'aliénation s'il est encore dû (The 
right to separation of patrimonies is exercised on the property as long as it is owned by the 
heir or on the price of the sale if it is still unpaid). 
252. III-321. La séparation des patrimoines a lieu dans les successions testamentaires de la 
même manière que dans les successions ab intestat... (Separation of patrimonies takes 
place in testamentary succession in the same manner as in intestate succession...) III-322. 
La séparation des patrimoines a lieu à rencontre des créanciers du légataire dans le cas de 
réduction du legs particulier (Separation of patrimonies operates to the detriment of the 
creditors of the legatee whenever a particular legacy is reduced). III-399. Dans l'exercise de 
leurs droits, le grevé ou ses successeurs ont droit à la séparation des patrimoines contre 
l'appelé et ils peuvent retenir les biens jusqu'au paiement (The institute or his successors, 
in exercising their rights, are entitled to separation of patrimonies against the substitute, 
and may retain the property until they are paid). 
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separation for the benefit of the institute works for his benefit only as 
institute, not as ordinary creditor of the substitute ; that is, he benefits only 
as related to the patrimony of the substitution, not as related to the 
patrimony of the substitute, although the substitute holds both and owns the 
goods in each. 
A setting of patrimonial considerations analogous to that of intestacies 
and of testamentary gifts mortis causa occurs regarding gifts inter vivos, at 
article V-472 of the fifth book on obligations253. The concept and mechanics 
of separation of patrimonies here is meant to be the same, except that here 
the possibility of fraud intended upon creditors is increased yet more. The 
more striking difference, however, is that here the small patrimony of the gift 
has not been already separated from the person of the donor by his death, 
before being separated from the patrimony of the donee, but rather the 
donor must first pry himself loose from it while persisting in whatever other 
patrimonial endeavours he may. Less than in successions is the patrimony 
inseparable from person, for while there it is loosed by natural fact of death, 
here it is loosed by mere legal will. 
Nothing in the draft is more striking that the use of the new concept in 
a new institution. The questions to be seen later about an alleged incompa-
tibility between the trust and the civilian ownership are cut through in the 
fourth book by article IV-603254. Again the stress is upon the self-
containment of the property making up the patrimony ; it is distinct. But 
only the English text, not the French, says what patrimony the trust 
patrimony is distinct from ; it is distinct from the trustee's own patrimony. 
But whose, then, is it? The trustee's while just distinct from his own? The 
grantor's ? The beneficiairies' ? Or need not this question be posed at all ? For 
article 1-4 stated that every person has a patrimony, not that every 
patrimony has a person. Already it has appeared that ownership of the 
goods and integration of the patrimony as one's own are two different 
things. It still must be possible, however, at least to identify a titulaire or one 
who holds the patrimony as part of its concept ; the draft does not inform us 
who this is, nor even whether it is a singular interest as against a duality of 
interest, the beneficiary's and the trustee's. 
253. IV-472. Les créanciers du donateur et ceux du donataire ont droit à la séparation des 
patrimoines, selon les règles énoncées au Livre des Successions (The creditors of the 
donor and of the donee are entitled to separation of patrimonies according to the Book on 
Succession). 
254. IV-603. Les biens transportés en fiducie forment un patrimoine distinct... (Property 
transferred in trust constitutes a patrimony which is distinct from that of the trustee...) 
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In the next book, damage insurance is defined in terms of a remedy for 
patrimony at article V-874. Since the intent of the article is to distinguish 
between two types of insurance, some further grasp of patrimony can be 
gained by attending to what the alternative kind of insurance, personal 
insurance, is defined in terms of255. Article V-869 gives life, health and 
physical integrity as the latter. In addition to this distinction of patrimony 
and person, the patrimony can be adversely affected in a way that can be 
guaranteed against, whereas person may be "dealt sith" in a way not 
restricted to adverse effects on the one hand but not set in terms of any 
guarantees on the other hand. A universe of speculation lies just under the 
surface of these two articles. 
The final articles of the draft code which employ the term in both 
languages are found in the ninth book on private international law256. In 
article IX-20 the conflict of laws concerning the form of a legal act is settled 
by allowing such a vast exception for patrimonial matters that the general 
rule of the first paragraph, and the long list or articles preceding this and 
governing the form of personal acts, are rendered almost inapplicable. In 
article IX-48 the conflict of jurisdictions is settled in the area of "personal 
rights of a patrimonial nature", by giving jurisdiction to Quebec courts in 
some cases. The stress in the two versions is different : the personal matière is 
the basic consideration of the French text, modified by its patrimoniality ; 
while their patrimonial nature is prominent in English. Whichever is 
stressed, what is acknowledged explicitly is an absence of strong separation 
between person and patrimony, although by the very fact that both terms are 
required there remains a distinction of some sort. The personal matters of 
articles IX-51 to IX-59 are strongly distinguished from the patrimonial 
matters of IX-50, regarding real rights ; but the article we are studying is not 
cleanly placed within this distinction, and thus it may be concluded that 
neither is the concept of patrimony. 
255. V-869. L'assurance des personnes porte sur la vie, la santé ou l'intégrité physique de 
l'assuré. V-874. L'assurance de dommages garantit l'assuré des conséquences d'un 
événement pouvant porter atteinte à son patrimoine (... patrimony). 
256. IX-20. La forme d'un acte juridique est régie par la loi du lieu où il est passé. Est 
néanmoins valable l'acte relatif au patrimoine qui est fait dans la forme requise par la loi 
applicable au fond de cet acte ou par celle du lieu de la situation des biens qui en font 
l'objet... (The form of juridical acts is governed by the law of the place where the act is 
passed. An act relating to patrimony is nevertheless valid if made in the form required by 
the law applicable to the substance of the act or by that of the place where the property 
which is its object is situated...). IX-48. En matière personnelle à caractère patrimonial, les 
tribunaux du Québec ont compétence générale dans les cas suivants: ... (In matters 
involving personal rights of a patrimonial nature, the courts of Quebec have general 
jurisdiction when:...) 
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4.2. Doctrine 
Besides the explicit legislative appeals to the concept of patrimony in the 
draft code, there are other articles which, by previous doctrine, are 
associated with the implicit appeal to patrimony, as well as commentary 
upon the draft which both explicitly uses and implicitly contributes to the 
understanding of patrimony. 
4.2.1. Traditional Implication of Patrimony 
Among the former, some articles suggest the classical unity of patri-
mony, others its divisibility, and still others characterize the contents of 
patrimony in such a way that one or the other of the first two positions is 
rendered more likely. Article III-4 lays out the universal character of an 
inheritance : there is no distinction among the types of goods found in it. Its 
counterpart for the patrimony of the living person is article V-193, which 
assembles all one's possessions into the single "common pledge" securing his 
creditors ; it is common, that is, single or unique or universal, both because 
the goods are assembled indiscriminately and the creditors claim all 
together. The exceptions to this universality are that some creditors take 
precedence and some goods are exempted. But preferences in the draft are 
reduced by contraction of privileges, while increased by expansion of 
hypothecs in title five of the fifth book ; and unseizable property is described 
in article IV-278. One purpose for universalizing a patrimony is for 
accounting purposes, as directed in article 111-65 between an heir and the 
succession, and in article III-123 between the succession's creditors and the 
heir who seeks protection from them by claiming benefit of inventory, his 
equivalent of their separation of patrimonies. But the integrality of the goods 
is broken when the parties or their legal relations are of special types ; thus 
particular heirs fail to receive benefits of contracts by article V-73, and only 
the indivisible obligation remains undivided in succession, unlike the 
solidary obligation, under articles V-171 and V-183. Even within the broken 
integrity received by the particular heir, however, there remain universalities 
of assets and liabilities as in article III-319 which meet the description of 
patrimony in article 1-4. 
4.2.2. Patrimony and Personality 
The commentaries pick out as one of two major goals of the draft that 
administration of patrimony be simplified, as at the start of the first book. 
This overall thrust of the draft appears especially in this book at the section 
on tutorship: the tutor must be able to act quickly, upon a mere report, 
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without constant fear of a heavily protective hand, and for this he should be 
encouraged by a salary257. 
This is not really at odds with the alternative and overriding general 
purpose of the revision effort, namely, to protect the person, despite some 
possible conflicts258. For he is protected by protecting his patrimony, in the 
commentary at 1-114. The conflict seems to appear to the Revision Office to 
lie between patrimony and person. While such a notion as familial patrimony 
is not totally expunged, as shown by the expansion of the spousal mandate in 
cases of indisposition in the commentary to 11-216, it has disappeared for all 
practical purposes : so testamentary freedom is expanded at the expense of 
descendants' reserve at c.III-243 ; parental usufruct over personal damages 
won by their child is refused at a l l , page 124; and the prodigal is no longer 
protected. For when forced to make a choice between personal rights and 
family interest, the person wins out, according to c.I, page 21. Person wins 
over any private interest, by c.V-301, for his status is of public order by 
c.11-272, at least Quebec public order if not everybody's under c.IX-5. 
On the other hand, while the family-grouping loses its hold on a 
patrimony, the partnership-grouping can now possess its own patrimony, 
distinct from its partners' patrimonies ; the most interesting feature of such a 
change is that this endowment is explicitly made to depend upon the 
partnerships' acquisition of legal personality, at c.V, page 591, and c.V-748. 
That is, patrimony depends upon personality even if only personality by 
representation (though not obligatorily according to art. 111-83), which art. 
111-32 defines as before. 
Distinctly patrimonial are matters of real rights and of succession ; 
distinctly personal are matters regarding the status of persons ; mediating 
between them are borderline matters, "personal of a patrimonial nature", in 
art. IX-48. Status, the definitional criterion of persons, is different between 
physical and moral persons by reason of certain incapabilities in the latter, 
by c.I-4; but there is nothing any more essential and final about the 
incapacities than of ordinary incapability. For moral persons are unable to 
marry or to give testimony not because they cannot so bind themselves or 
suffer sanction, both of which they surely can do, but because they lack 
genitals and lack ears, respectively, just as a physical person lacking same 
cannot perform the actions requiring them. 
But while in these places the association of patrimony to person is so 
forceful, it is disclaimed with equal force of the trust-patrimony. To cast the 
257. I, p. 16; 146 and p. 20; 224-227; 180; 131. Henceforward, a reference to the term 
"patrimony" or other relevant categories in the commentary will be indicated by "c." 
before the reference, and an Article in the draft text by "art". 
258. C.I, p. 96, n.52, and p. 97, n.62. 
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concept of the trust property into the form of a patrimony is the civilian 
answer to the common law distinction of interests, legal and equitable, and 
perhaps even of ownerships ; whichever it be, its mix into Louisiana civilian 
law was unsuccessful and the Quebec draft's conceptualization is intended as 
its more civilian remedy259. The remedy consists in making the trust 
property into a patrimony distinct from the trustee's personal patrimony ; 
the result is to ensure the autonomy of the patrimoine fidiciaire, and in turn 
its permanence regardless of change in trustees260. The solution is surely not 
that of the common law ; but it is just as certainly not explained in terms of 
that civilian doctrinal school which bonds patrimony to personality. 
The primacy of person is reinforced by bringing to the fore those 
obligations which do not have en soi de valeur patrimoniale at c.V, page 571. 
What they consist in, however, is left blank, except for the definitions given 
before in a. 1-4. The splendid opportunity to ground this theme is let slip in 
the commentary to article 1-4, where not only the distinction of patrimonial 
and extrapatrimonial is passed in silence, but also the obliteration in the 
commentary alone of the distinction between extrapatrimonial rights and 
civil liberties. While the distinction according to provincial competencies as 
against federal is only an artificial hurdle to the latter assimilation, the 
distinction did not originate in such an area ; and so some explanation of the 
distinction and its rejection here would have been helpful, not least to the 
present study. At any rate, the primacy of obligations extrapatrimonial by 
reason of personal attachment and absence of patrimonial value is left at 
least querelous by the presence of numerous contractual obligations distinctly 
patrimonial without using the term despite the draft's notes that they are 
formed intuitu personae261. 
4.2.3. Constitution of Patrimony by Contents 
The most fascinatingly explicit if brief dealing of the draft commentary 
with the notion of patrimony, beyond the way it is connected to personality, 
is the way it is constituted in terms of its contents : how they adhere to each 
other, how contents enter and leave, and most of all what those contents are 
in order to be able so to combine and pass. These three points take up the 
reminder of this commentary upon the commentaries. 
Firstly, patrimony continues to be conceived as a universality as at 
c.IV-113. While attention to l'ensemble du patrimoine implies that attention 
259. CIV, p. 380; n.51, p. 545. 
260. CIV, p. 380. 
261. V-589 contract with mandatory; V-90(l) right of revocation ; V-105 gestion d'affaires; 
V-217 hire; V-695 enterprise; V-972 insurance; V-1217 arbitration. 
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could be given only to part, also, such that its ensemble is a matter of fact 
and not essential, nonetheless this ensemble is treated in the same way as 
another "universality". But this other universality, in turn, is an ensemble of 
fungibles, implying that this is an inherent feature of patrimony, too ; that is, 
in order for objects to lose their identity enough to join into one indiscri-
minate whole, they must be replaceable without loss being involved in the 
replacement. This does not involve a loss of identity as against other items in 
the ensemble, any more than it does in a consumable whole; for the 
comestible with vitamin C cannot be replaced by one with vitamin B. The 
loss of identity occurs only vis-à-vis objects replacing the originals. And this 
is of no particular help in conceptualizing the universality. A reflection of the 
failure to think it through is the use of patrimoine at one time as synonymous 
with a mass of value contained within it at c.11-107 and 108, and again as 
distinct from it at c.III-65 and 66. 
The event constitutive of patrimony is, first of all, its separation from 
other patrimonies. This is no privilege, for the benefit of only some ; rather it 
is for the benefit of all creditors, at c.VIII-6(3). Making the benefit for all 
creditors, those of the deceased and those of the heir, as well as effecting it by 
law and not by demand, for acquisition both by succession in c.III-181 and 
182 and by gift inter vivos at c. V-472, this stresses the institutional character 
of patrimony, and the disinclination to define it in terms of its holder's will. 
This is reflected by c. IV-95. The function of separation is institutional, that 
is, towards all the world, just as the return of gifts to the patrimony is for 
spouse as well as creditors, at c.III-65 and 66. 
As in the separation of patrimonies at c.III-181 and 182(3), timing the 
exit from patrimony of the goods being sought is important in paulian 
actions, as at c.V-201. In both, the patrimony fluctuates through time, rather 
than remaining unchanging; in the latter case, this fluctuation is made 
essential to patrimony by being offerred as an explanation of why the 
creditor must show his debt to be prior to the act of disposition which is 
under attack, rather than being a mere observation. In entry as well as in 
exit, goods differ as to the relevant time : for example, "patrimonial rights" 
under a marriage covenant are acquired rights from the moment of 
marriage, while successoral rights are so only from the opening of the 
succession, at c.III-59, which acquisition is their moment of entry to the 
patrimony. 
This favour towards a patrimony stabilized through time, the surprising 
effect of the temporally prominent character of entry and exit, works some 
equally surprising effects upon transactions, whether upon their constitution 
or their comprehension. Of the former sort is the hypothec now presumed 
wherever a creditor has a particular right on a good : such is his right solely, 
142 Les Cahiers de Droit (1981) 22 c. de D. 81 
even where it could not appear more clearly from the documented transaction 
that the debtor was agreeing to the goods leaving his patrimony, at c.IV-281 
to 284, on page 432 ; the drastic change wrought here remains a hypothec, 
never a mortgage. The same underpinning on patrimony explains the 
abolition of the vendor's privilege with the rest. For he has contributed no 
more than others to enriching the debtor's patrimony : he has brought about 
no enrichment at all, for the assets of the patrimony are increased only to the 
same amount that the liabilities are increased, cancelling each other out, at 
c.IV on page 370. Running this explanation in reverse, the value given by a 
bankrupt debtor to an unsuspecting third party has never left the debtor's 
patrimony, never entered the third's ; since the third has given nothing in 
return, the recovery of the payment to the bankrupt's patrimony is not an 
impoverishment of the third's patrimony, but only its failure to be increased, 
un manque à gagner, at c.V-199. 
4.2.4. Contents of Patrimony 
Patrimony, so constituted in relation to person, could have the features 
it does only if its contents were such as to permit of a like treatment. Indeed, 
even to be conceived as a universality which has contents rather than one 
which obliterates its contents' identity depends upon what sort of contents 
these are. The furniture in the halls of patrimony are set out in the mild-
mannered definitions commencing book four, Les biens (Property)262. While 
it is their explanation in the commentary which is of crucial importance to the 
subject, this study will proceed by first locating effects of this revision of 
definition in the draft code's articles, both in order to raise the questions 
which the redefinitions answer, and to introduce the historical study which 
they call for. 
The draft code permits acquisition by prescription not only of le droit de 
propriété by a period of ten years, but also permits it of les démembrements 
du droit de propriété such as un droit d'usufruit or un droit de servitude réel or 
l'emphytéose26i. As for extinctive prescription, the draft permits it after ten 
years for des droits réels sauf la propriété ; until now, the present code had 
required thirty years to extinguish les droits réels relatifs26". 
262. IV-1. Les biens sont les droits personnels et réels d'une personne (Property consists of the 
personal and real rights that belong to a person). IV-2. Les droits réels portent sur des 
choses ou sur des droits (Real rights relate to things or to rights). IV-3. Les biens et les 
choses sont meubles ou immeubles (Property and things are moveable or immoveable). 
263. VII-41 ; VII, p. 921, no. 4. 
264. Id, no. 6. 
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Les droits réels are not able to be expanded in number indefinitely; 
there is what is, elsewhere, called a numerus clausus of real rights. This is 
stated explicitly by overruling the Privy Council's decision in Matamajaw 
Salmon Club v. Duchaine. Any candidates for classification as a new real 
right must be fitted under the existing categories or be denied recognition as 
a real right at all. So benefits such as rights to hunt or fish must be a real 
right which is personal in its use and so temporary (usufruct) or a real right 
which burdens land for other land (servitude), as at c.IV-94. 
Propriété is a more restricted term than droit immobilier, for the latter 
contains both ownership and its dismemberments, according to c.VIII-6. 
Propriété is a more restricted term than droits, for rights other than those of 
ownership may be hypothecated, e.g., a mere créance as at c.IV-402. Droit is 
a more restricted term than intérêt, for the latter may be only indirect, as at 
c.IV-515. Among interests, d'avantage pécuniaire is a more restricted term 
than profit, for the material community may derive use or enjoyment from a 
thing without deriving any pecuniary benefit, at c. 11-143 and 144. 
The relevance of these distinctions is that they point up just what it is 
which constitutes the assets of the patrimony : personal rights and real rights 
constitute the assets of the patrimony. Biens are defined as such rights in 
article IV-1 ; this redefinition neutralizes the error of Roman law perpetuated 
throughout the centuries, it is alleged at c.IV, page 345. No more frank 
acknowledgement could be asked for a totally new start in civilian law, for 
patrimony is reconstituted when its components are, and person is recons-
tituted when that from which he is distinguished is. 
The Romans' error, explains a full page of commentary at c.IV-1, was to 
identify the right of property with the thing which is its object. As Jhering is 
quoted to have recognized the error, basically formative of Roman law, it is : 
"dans la propriété, confondre] la chose et le droit". They are brought under 
one category : biens = choses + droits. 
The remedy also is Jhering's, quoted from Savatier : that all biens in a 
patrimony are droits, i.e., incorporeal biens only265. The right of property is 
265. François Frenette criticizes this opposition indue entre choses et biens in "Le rapport de 
l'O.R.C.C. sur les biens", (1976) 17 C. deD. 991, p. 997 : "... 'les biens d'une personne sont 
l'ensemble de ses droits personnels et réels.' Cette définition en est une, non pas des biens, 
mais plutôt de l'actif du patrimoine. ... il prétend limiter les biens aux droits, à l'actif du 
patrimoine. Or la notion du bien a une extension plus grande que celle du droit et même 
que celle du patrimoine... Pour considérer une chose comme un bien, il suffit en effet 
qu'elle soit susceptible d'appropriation, et non pas qu'elle soit effectivement appropriée. 
Au demeurant, à vouloir restreindre les biens aux droits, le Comité, fort de l'opinion de 
Savatier, néglige l'appropriation du fait, la possession, qui est valeur économique 
indéniable méritant figurer d'une quelconque façon au patrimoine." 
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like other real rights : it is incorporeal ; it has corporeal things as object only ; 
it is not itself a corporeal thing. Patrimony contains only incorporeal biens, 
i.e., rights. But, and the note at c.IV, page 384 is important, rights are 
themselves exercised over either concrete corporeal objects, or over abstract 
incorporeal objects. "Les biens sont les droits personnels et réels; ils 
constituent l'actif du patrimoine." Included therein are rights, as article IV-2 
if not the commentary clarifies : the patrimony consists of rights over rights. 
This is all that Matamajaw had claimed. As was noted earlier, the object 
of a right was less for the Romans a thing than the very legal relation which 
constitutes the right itself, so that this critique is correct only within an 
alternative narrowly modernistic perspective but wrongheaded beyond it, as 
is the characterization of patrimony, consequently. In addition, it need only 
be observed that, within the draft code and commentary itself, the "object" 
of a right or duty is not identified with the thing but with an incorporeal. 
Thus, at article V-l the object of an obligation is identified with .a 
"prestation", which the commentary is at pains to distinguish from a 
"quelque chose" of the current law in C.C. 1058. And at article V-41 the 
object of a contract is an activity : to create, modify, transfer or extinguish 
obligations or real rights, without commentary. 
5. Alternative settings of patrimony 
Alternatives to the unity, universality, and attachment to personal will 
which characterize patrimony classically are sought in this chapter. Here it is 
not the question whether one can speak of these features without patrimony, 
but whether there is an alternative rationalization of patrimony itself, in the 
absence of these features. 
5.1. Non-Civilian Alternative: Common Law 
In common law the relation between legal personality and an equivalent 
to patrimony is unknown266. One result is that partners may act for the 
interest of their partnership, which lacks legal personality, only by acting 
each in his own name267. Another is that a succession may float, without 
attaching to person as a patrimony must in civilian law. "Contrairement au 
principe 'le mort saisit le vif du droit civil, dérivé du droit romain, la loi 
américaine considère les biens et les dettes d'un défunt comme une entité 
légale séparée, comme étant la 'succession du défunt' "268. Further, since 
266. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 45, pp. 21-22, no. 29, n.3; p. 143, no. 154, n.l. 
267. Id., p. 200, no. 198. 
268. F.G. OPTON and A. FREEMAN, "Loi américaine sur les successions", tr. J.S. MACKAY, 
(1977-1978) 80 R. du N. 212. 
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there is no personal universality to the passive patrimony or to its subject, 
codebtors are not subject to one and the same obligation, but each of those 
many individuals is held to a like but different liability, so that the failure of 
one to pay does not affect the liability of the others269. 
The property in incorporeals which is essential to the universalizing of 
patrimony by attaching it to will is, nonetheless, present in common law. 
Salmond recognizes two terms : ownership, bearing only upon corporeals ; 
and property, over anything capable of appropriation, including claims. 
Further, he defines even ownership as "the relation between a person and any 
right vested in him... Every man is, in this sense, the owner of all rights which 
are his"210. 
While the estate appears to be the same sort of universality of rights as 
patrimony — "... each kind of estate became to some extent reified — it 
became a thing that could be 'owned'"271 —, it is not equivalent to the 
universality which englobed the rights of property in an object, but rather to 
a medium between the holder and his land272. So while particular estates 
analogous to the civilian real rights are a sharing of whatever "ownership" 
might be alleged, because that ownership is a holding-of-another (tenure) 
and a holding-for-a-period (limitation), the civilian property is a relation to 
the objects owned without any intermediary so that any "dismemberment" 
of these rights are "real rights, but no part of the ownership"273. Common 
law ownership in an object is splinters of relationships to other persons ; 
civilian property is unified regarding any single object, and is unified only 
that much more when it is the property upon one's patrimony. That is why, 
in the following description of property in objects, the characterization 
corresponds to the often repeated characterization of patrimony as a 
contenant rather than its contenu : 
Romanic ownership can be thought of as a box, with the word "ownership" 
written on it. Whoever has the box is the "owner". In the case of complete, 
unencumbered ownership, the box contains certain rights, including that of use 
and occupancy, that to the fruits or income, and the power of alienation. The 
owner can, however, open the box and remove one or more such rights and 
transfer them to others. But, as long as he keeps the box, he still has the 
ownership, even if the box is empty. 
269. S. GINOSSAR, supra, note 18, p. 8, no. 4, n.15. 
270. Id., p. 41, no. 15, n.72, citing with Salmond's emphasis. 
271. J.H. MERRYMAN, "Ownership and Estates ; Variations on a Theme by Lawson". (1974) 48 
Tulane L.R. 916, p. 929. 
272. Id., p. 925. 
273. Ibid. 
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The contrast with the Anglo-American law of property is simple. There is no 
box. There are merely various sets of legal interests. One who has the fee simple 
absolute has the largest possible bundle of such sets of legal interests. When he 
conveys one or more of them to another person, a part of the bundle is gone.274 
Ownership in common law systems differs most noticeably from civilian by 
the presence of trusts. Despite the fact that the self-containment of its assets 
and liabilities is taken by civilians to make trust the very model of a 
patrimoine d'affectation275, the division of interests between legal and 
equitable is not a division of civilian ownership, such that their addition 
equates its whole276. Rather, trust effects a contraction of ownership, not 
just its division : the trust corpus is immune to the holders of either interest, 
as well as to both together277. 
Waters considers the same common law alternative to patrimony, but in 
terms of the problems which would attend its introduction into civilian law. 
In civilian law, again, the direct relation of owner to owned object is central ; 
it remedies the Old Law's ranked interests in land, and accordingly the 
ranking of persons. It is formulated as ownership that is autonomous and 
indivisible, which one may add forms a model for patrimony; it results in 
other rights being either merely personal or else a closed list of rights over 
some other owner's thing, rather than being a share of his ownership such 
as would diminish his certainty. Waters suggests that the only way for a 
civilian to comprehend the trust is as a fondation, stipulation pour autrui, 
mandat or dépôt, none of which breach the principle of absolute ownership. 
His comparison to patrimoine affecté or herditas jacens of modern or ancient 
civilian tradition, then, implies that these notions clearly have nothing in 
common with the patrimony of the classical theorists278. 
5.2. Non-French Civilian System: Germany 
The German civil code, as well as the Swiss, makes property bear only 
upon a corpus, not upon incorporeals279. The corresponding fact about 
274. Id., p. 927. This description in terms of estates and landlaw is generalized by Honoré and 
then reapplied to the concept of possession constituting the "ownership" of personalty by 
Harris. See: D.R. HARRIS, "The Concept of Possession in English Law", and A.M. 
HONORÉ, "Ownership" both in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (First Series), Ed. A.G. 
GUEST, Oxford, Clarendon, 1961, pp. 69 and 107 respectively. 
275. As by Speth, supra, note 45, p. 264, no. 258. 
276. Despite the fact that earlier Roman "bonitary" and "quiritary" ownerships parallelled the 
distinction between beneficial and legal interests : J.H. MERRYMAN, supra, note 271, p. 940. 
277. J.H. MERRYMAN, supra, note 271, p. 941, n.65. 
278. D.W.M. WATERS, Law of Trusts in Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1974, pp. 931-936. 
279. S. GINOSSAR, supra, note 18, p. 41, no. 15, n.72; incorporeal things are not even 
recognized : M.G.V. SCHERER, Principales différences entre le Code Napoléon (1804) et le 
Code Guillaume II (1900), Paris, Librairie de la société du recueil général des lois et des 
arrêts Larose, 1903, p. 18, no. 37. 
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patrimony ( Vermoegen) is that it is not conceptually related to any notion of 
personality : its object not being a feature of personality, viz., rights or their 
universalization, there is neither need nor possibility of identifying patrimony 
with personality, or of attaching them inseparably. Thus detached from 
personality, patrimony is envisaged in a strictly objective manner, as an 
ensemble of goods and services constituting a legal whole. The objects, the 
content, is looked to more than the subject, the container. As one result, it is 
possible for patrimony to be ceded in its entirety to another person, not 
simply mortis causa but inter vivos. The patrimony, the assets and liabilities 
tallied at the time of gift., are what are given ; the person is not given, for his 
possibilities of holding property do not make up patrimony. This donation, 
the Vermoegensuebernahme of art. 419 B.G.B., 
du point de vue de la doctrine française, ... aurait pour effet de réaliser la 
cession du contenu du patrimoine cristallisé à un moment déterminé, le 
patrimoine en tant que contenant "en puissance" continuant à subsister.280 
This is also the case of the German doctrine; but there is nothing of 
patrimony which continues to attach to that potentiality. 
The unity of these goods must be founded elsewhere. For unity there is. 
The real rights are simply "splinters of ownership that have become 
independent" ; and, though they could be increased in number at will, unlike 
the French corresponding dismemberment, they are all reducible to owner-
ship281. Unity of ownership is kept not by making them rights in the land of 
another, but parts of ownership. As well, the principle of universal succession 
attains : there can be no break in the seisin, the heir takes the whole, and does 
so immediately on the death of the testator282. 
The unity of the different elements is found in their common end 
{Zweck) ; under this theory of Zweckvermoegen derived from Jhering, the 
patrimony is found not so much pertinere ad aliquem as pertinere ad 
aliquid2". With subjective unity, but only as much "universality" as is 
required for any transmission of several rights under a single title, "the 
property falling to the heir passed to him as an objective unity, without 
regard to the question whether it constituted the entire property of the 
deceased or only a certain part ofthat"284. Universality means only that each 
280. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 45, p. 22, no. 29, n.3 ; also p. 143, no. 154, n.l. 
281. R. HUEBNER, A History of Germanic Private Law, tr. F.S. PHILBRICK, Boston, Little, 
Brown, 1918, no. 31, p. 299; quoting Gierke. 
283. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 45, p. 21, no. 29, n.3; R. VON IHERING, Der Zweck im Recht, 
Leipzig, 1877. 
282. W. BRESLAUER, The Private International Law of Succession in England, America and 
Germany, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1937, p. 144. 
284. R. HUEBNER, supra, note 281, no. 102, p. 699. 
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portion of the inheritance {Nachvermoegeri) is universalized into a distinctive 
grouping (Sondervermoegen)2*5. 
5.3. Non-Classical French Doctrine 
5.3.1. Nineteenth Century Objectivism: Saleilles 
The same influences which directed the Wilhelmite codification re-
oriented also the later French conprehension of their own code, and 
patrimony in it. The French leader was Raymond Saleilles, his German 
model was Rudolph von Jhering, and the turning point was the doctrine of 
will, the key to classical French doctrine's universalization of patrimony. 
"Loin de nous apparaître comme la volonté en exercice, le droit se présente à 
nous, selon le mot de Jhering, comme un but supérieur ayant la volonté à 
son service." How could such a drastic reformation of French doctrine have 
taken place ? By agreeable steps : 
La volonté a cessé d'être un but, elle n'a pas cessé d'être un moyen, et le moyen 
lorsqu'il est indispensable à la réalisation d'un but ne cesse pas d'être un 
élément essentiel de l'institution à laquelle se relient les deux termes. La volonté 
devenue le moyen de la réalisation du droit est un élément différent sans doute 
de la volonté, but exclusif du droit, mais non moins essentiel à sa conception et 
à sa constitution.286 
This could even masquerade under the same auspices as Willensmachttheorie : 
Roman law's transmission of personality created not a new personality, but 
the old one now freed of its physical bearer, or any other physical form. 
Instead it rested upon the newly personified State287. Through this vehicle, 
the force of will is maintained, but "dérivée, non initiale" as in earlier 
nineteenth century individualism ; its force "ne se justifie que par l'accord de 
cette volonté avec la règle de droit qui préexiste et la domine"288. 
285. As in customary French law, no general principle governed successoral transmission, 
according to the thirteenth-century Sachsenspiegel nr\A Schwabenspiegel: "l'ensemble des 
biens du défunt se disperse à sa mort" (F. BOULANGER, supra, note 33, p. 25, no. 21). 
286. R. SALEILLES, De la personnalité juridique, Paris, Rousseau, 1910, p. 532; quoted by 
M. DESLANDRES, "Les travaux de Raymond Saleilles sur les questions sociales", 
E. THALLER, in L'œuvre juridique de Raymond Saleilles, Paris, Rousseau, 1914, p. 265. 
287. Ed. MEYNIAL, "Les Travaux de R. Saleilles sur le Droit romain", in E. THALLER, supra, 
note 286, p. 225. 
288. E. GAUDEMET, "Raymond Saleilles et le Code civil allemand", in E. THALLER, supra, note 
286, 141, the first phrase taken from Saleilles' Introduction à l'étude du droit civil allemand, 
Paris, Pichon, 1904, p. 45. 
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5.3.2. Early Twentieth Century Objectivism 
Examples of transplanted influence by German objectivism abound 
through the turn of the century. A spate of theses focus the critique on 
French subjectivism and directly upon the notion of patrimony. More 
frankly than others, Pierre Cazelles makes his own the positivist claim of 
R. Roguin, equally as derivative as the contemporaneous American legal 
realism from the degeneration of Jhering's sociological doctrines into 
lnteressenjurisprudenz : "Au fond de cette discussion l'on retrouve la vieille 
querelle des réaux et des nominaux et nous sommes nominalistes déclarés"289. 
Cazelles shows the extent of success the classical theory had enjoyed : from 
the original position that patrimony is a necessary consequence of the 
features of personality, namely its unicity of will and its resulting conti-
nuance, he can state in all innocence precisely the opposite relationship, that 
"la seule, la vraie raison d'être de ce principe de continuation de la personne 
se trouve dans la conception du patrimoine", "cette conception spéciale de 
l'universalité du patrimoine"290. Nonetheless he lays the finger correctly 
upon the logical flaw in classical doctrine : that Aubry and Rau's "deduc-
tion" of the idea of patrimony from the idea of personality is not a detailed 
reasoning process but is rather a simple substitution of patrimony for 
personality, and an application to patrimony of all the characteristics and 
consequences of personality291. In traditional logic one could identify the 
fallacy as superalternation : substituting "all" for "some". What Cazelles 
misses is the reason for this : that the kantian person's existence is his will, his 
control of the world, and nothing more. Upon that premise, no fallacy arises. 
The paradox is that, while Cazelles criticizes this as an intellectual 
abstraction to the neglect of the economic reality of patrimony, the classical 
doctrine sets itself out as a distorted mirror image of property. In the 
enlightning phrase of a minor classical author Cazelles cites in passing, the 
person's property (attribute) becomes his property (possession) : "der Mensch 
ist nicht sowohl vermoegensfaehig, er hat Vermoe gensfaehigkeit"292. Rights 
inhere not in the person, but in the patrimony he owns. 
289. De l'idée de la continuation de la personne comme principe des transmissions universelles, 
Paris, 1905, p. 392. See also : J. JALLU, Essai critique sur l'idée de continuation de la 
personne considérée comme principe des transmissions à titre universel, Paris, 1902; 
L. PLASTARA, La notion juridique du patrimoine, Paris, 1903; R. REMPLER, L'individu et son 
patrimoine, Paris, 1910 ; P. G AZIN, Essai critique sur la notion de patrimoine dans la doctrine 
classique, Dijon, 1910, at Saleilles' home university. 
290. P. CAZELLES, supra, note 289, pp. 367-368. 
291. Id., p. 371. 
292. Id., p. 373, n . l ; from Neuner. 
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Yet it is not this excess of zeal in the first branch of traditional 
methodology, distinguer pour unir, that Cazelles attacks but the second : 
La personne est titulaire de son patrimoine, elle est donc son propre sujet, elle 
s'appartient à elle-même. Si, entre deux notions que vous distinguez soigneu-
sement, vous établissez un rapport d'interdépendence, on ne saurait rationnel-
lement le transformer en équivalence. De deux choses l'une : ... Ce que l'on 
peut distinguer ne saurait se confondre.293 
To be distinguishable, elements must be separable ; to be separable, they 
must be different existents : this is the Cartesian methodology294 allegedly 
derivative from Ockham as a "razor" shaving off inseparable entities, of 
which the subjectivism inveighed is but one development and the objectivism 
applauded is the other. 
Negatively, the core of the critique here is that no difference can be 
grounded between a universality of fact among separate economic objects 
{sachenrechtliche Einheit) and the universality of law which patrimony was 
alleged to be. Cazelles is as frank as earlier :the difference collapses because 
the legal universality of patrimony is just an attempt to objectify conditions, 
to make the intramental extramental, to stop the flow: 
Comme les facultés de l'esprit, ce n'est que la personnification d'une cause, la 
réalisation de certaines conditions données dans l'abstraction... Ce n'est donc 
plus au patrimoine, simple universalité de biens que l'on succède, c'est à une 
entité intellectuelle, à quelque chose qui n'a jamais existé que dans le cerveau 
de ceux qui l'ont imaginé. Ce quelque chose, n'étant que le caractère successif 
des biens dans la fortune d'un individu, on a voulu le fixer, le personnifier... Au 
fond, c'est l'érection en entité juridique du caractère successif du patrimoine... 
Le patrimoine est, en somme, une expression collective servant à désigner un 
groupement de choses individuelles, et rien en dehors.2 '5 
Affirmatively, patrimony is only a current account, a running tally. It is 
successive, it requires suspension until a final liquidation, it locates credit in 
the debtor's economic activity as a negative element and not a charge upon 
the positive, and it disintegrates any idea of patrimony as some object. The 
only universal feature of rights in a patrimony is that they have influence one 
upon the other. "Il n'y a pas de patrimoine, il n'y a que des droits 
patrimoniaux. Le patrimoine n'est pas une chose existant en soi, ce n'est 
qu'une qualité des droits"296. Once given credit, execution upon goods and 
293. Id., p. 377. 
294. Les principes de la philosophie, I, 45-46. 
295. P. CAZELLES supra, note 289, pp. 382, 387, 392. 
296. Cazelles, p. 394, n.2, cites as the source for this metaphor, the only positive one he offers, 
the Leçons sur le mouvement social of Maurice Hauriou, app. II, p. 148, which JALLU, 
supra, note 289, p. 103, and PLASTARA, supra, note 289, p. 66, also follow. This source shall 
be a focal point in the conclusions to this study. 
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not person is inevitable ; once given goods as common pledge, the idea of 
patrimony is inevitable ; but once given this idea as a purely economic 
feature, the separation of patrimonies is inevitable not only as an option but 
as a matter of law297. Patrimony is rights which are independent, but 
influence each other. 
5.3.3. Recent Patrimonial Theory: Mazeaud 
One cannot possess a notion of patrimony, as he can possess a 
patrimony ; one may not have an objective patrimonial capacity to acquire, 
as he has a patrimony ; and while the subjective capacity to acquire may be 
one, indivisible and inalienable, its realization may not be. "L'aptitude ne 
peut être gagée, elle ne peut être une universalité (n'étant pas un bien) et ne se 
transmet pas aux héritiers"29S. On the basis of such a critique at quarter-
century, already less profound, and despite its contrary judgment that 
passive elements are not part of patrimony but a charge upon it, the same 
conclusion follows : "il a des éléments patrimoniaux et n'a que des éléments". 
Their only unity is to belong to the same patrimony ; so no unique right of 
property over patrimony occurs, either299. 
By mid-century the tempests of objectivism as well as subjectivism had 
subsided, and patrimony as a category with them. Mazeaud's treatment is 
characteristic. The first step is not to admit patrimony, but to admit 
universalities of rights and then patrimony as one type. The broader reason 
for universalities at all also bears the mark of the current philosophies of 
context, horizon and hermeneutic circle : "Mais, de même que l'homme ne 
vit qu'en société, les droits n'existent que groupés" ; "l'homme conçoit le 
nombre en même temps que l'unité" 30°. But, while no longer polemical, it is 
evident that purpose {Zweck) has won over faculty ( Wille) : "est-ce par notre 
volonté que nos droits forment un ensemble, que notre actif répond de notre 
passif... C'est en raison de leur affectation commune ; ils sont groupés autour 
de la personne, parce qu'ils lui sont affectés; ils sont les moyens de son 
activité"301. Patrimony precedes personality, rather than following it : rather 
than a person existing and controlling goods, goods are devoted to some 
purpose and then personality is granted. "Si l'œuvre prend vie, c'est parce 
que des biens lui sont affectés"302. Likewise, no difference appears between 
297. P. CAZELLES, supra, note 289, pp. 398-399 ; compare the conclusions of the Quebec draft. 
298. M.N. MEVORACH, "Le patrimoine" (1936) 35 R.D.C.T. 811, pp. 816-817. 
299. Id., p. 821, 824. 
300. H.L. et J. MAZEAUD, Leçons de droit civil, I, 4e éd. par DE JUGLART, Paris, Éd. 
Montchrestien, 1967, p. 314. 
301. Id., p. 322. 
302. Ibid. 
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the universality of fact and of law : "Reconnaître l'existence d'une univer-
salité de fait, c'est admettre qu'elle est gouvernée par des règles particulières ; 
ces règles ne peuvent être que de droit". The upshot of this reduction of 
patrimony is that any distinction between patrimonial rights and extra-
patrimonial is otiose303. 
5.3.4. Contemporary Patrimonial Theory: Uppsala Congress 
"La transformation du patrimoine dans le droit civil moderne" was the 
theme of the Seventh International Congress of Comparative Law at 
Uppsala in 1967. The conclusion was that while objectivist theories had 
vanquished classical subjectivism, the changed contents and nature of 
patrimonial goods had vanquished objectivism304. Although all recognized 
these criticisms both of classical and modern patrimonial theory, responses 
differed. While, on the one hand, the Latin American civilian systems show 
only a piecemeal detachment from a commitment in their codes to classical 
theory by no more than the typical "common pledge" articles305, the Eastern 
European systems' wholesale turn towards the objectivist theory of affec-
tation is made distinctive by their social destination of the means of 
production (individual property) while property destined to satisfy individual 
needs (personal property) alone stands in the typical position of a patrimony. 
The former is subject to jurisprudential debate, whether it constitutes the 
State's patrimony or that of the particular public enterprises306. Clearly 
metaphysics is not abolished by abolition of classical theory. 
But the major transformations occur in the content of patrimony, and 
thereby its notion. For if, on the one hand, there is no problem in the loose 
German patrimony of accommodating the "materiellen Erfolg seines 
303. Id., pp. 323-324. 
304. P. RAYNAUD, "La transformation du patrimoine dans le droit civil moderne", in Rapports 
généraux au VIIe Congrès international de droit comparatif, Stockholm, Almquist and 
Wiksel, 1967, 136, 137. 
305. G. KUMMEROW, "La Transformation del Patrimonio en el Derecho civil moderno" in 
Panencias Venezolanas al VII Congreso Internacional de Derecho comparado, Caracas, Publ. 
del Instituto de Derecho Privado, 1966, 71, 76, says, speaking also for at least Brazil and 
Honduras : "Tal tendencia [en los textos positivus afiliados al grupo germanico que 
el patrimonio se délimita en virtud del destino] no es trasplantable en bloque a legislaciones 
que, commo la venezolana, aun se sostienen sobre la armazon fundada por la teoria 
tradicional". 
306. J.S. PIATOWSKI, "La transformation du patrimoine dans le droit civil polonais moderne, in 
Rapports polonais présentés au 7e congrès international de droit comparé, Varsovie, 
Ossolineum, 1966, 223, 228-229. The same is true for Hungary, id., p. 228, n.17, and for 
the Soviet Union, per P. RAYNAUD, supra, note 304, p. 138 ; the Rumanian and Yugoslav 
reports were not available. 
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Wirkens, seiner Arbeit" as compatible with the subjective thrust of this 
civilian system307, the systems of French influence find it difficult to 
accommodate these in the traditional ways, that is, including things in 
patrimony only via rights over them. For present day patrimonies are 
composed more of things than of rights, though the things are of an 
incorporeal nature akin to rights308. The entire Belgian report studies these 
in concrete detail with no speculation : rights to clientele, right to occu-
pational position, public land management, and coproperty309. But by far 
the most important revision is that, in the French report, this changed 
content changes the very way of categorizing patrimony : from patrimonial/ 
extrapatrimonial, to a greater or less degree of patrimoniality. The scale is 
set up upon the following criteria : "plus forts sont l'intuitus personae et le 
caractère complexe ou abstrait des biens, plus nombreux sont les obstacles à 
leur pleine patrimonialité" 31°. These factors being determined by law more 
than by will, they do change. No value, then, can be said to be permanently 
extrapatrimonial; "il existe donc comme un élan des droits, une force 
d'ascension qui les pousse d'un degré à l'autre de la patrimonialité: 
évaluation, exigibilité, cessibilité, saisissabilité, transmissibilité et, pour finir, 
inclusion purement comptable dans la masse commune"311. For example: 
au pied de l'échelle on trouve les obligations naturelles, première ébauche d'un 
droit à naître ou reflet ultime d'un droit expirant. Évaluables en argent, elles ne 
confèrent même pas le droit au paiement, mais donnent une juste cause à 
l'exécution spontanée. Il arrive que leur existence précède et préface la 
reconnaissance des obligations civiles notamment alimentaires. À un degré 
plus haut se situent précisément ces droits alimentaires. Leur exigibilité étant 
énergiquement sanctionnée, ils nourrissent le patrimoine, mais demeurent 
indisponibles aux mains du créancier et échappent à ses ayants cause. Plus haut 
encore apparaissent les créances patrimoniales nées de l'atteinte apportée à un 
attribut extra-patrimonial de la personne : nom, honneur, affection, intégrité 
physique, droit au travail. Ces recours, aujourd'hui, foisonnent. Parfois ils 
contituent une étape du processus qui mène à la patrimonialité du droit 
protégé.312 
307. F. RITTNER, "Die Veraenderungen des Vermoegens im modernen deutschen Privatrecht", 
in Deutsche Landesreferate zum VII. Internationale Kongresz fuer Rechtsvergleichung im 
Uppsala, hrsg. E.V. CAEMMERER u. K. ZWEIGERT, Berlin, W. DEGRUYTER, 1967, 129, 
134-135. 
308. P. RAYNAUD, supra, note 304. 
309. J.-G. RENAULD, "La transformation du patrimoine dans le droit civil moderne", Rapports 
beiges au VIIe Congrès international de droit comparé, Bruxelles, C.I.D.C, 1966, 61-72. 
310. P. CATALA, "La transformation du patrimoine dans le droit civil moderne", (1966) 64 
R.T.D.C. 185, p. 206, no. 25. 
311. Id., pp. 212-213, no. 29. 
312. Id., p. 210, no. 28. 
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The conciliatory tenor of these reports is found also in contemporaneous 
monographs as to the person of the holder, the character of his holding, and 
the objects he can hold. Personality, if not determinative of patrimony, is not 
irrelevant to it (Speth) ; property extends over not just things, but also rights 
(Ginossar); and patrimoniality continually eats into extrapatrimoniality 
(Blondel). In Speth's view, classical connection of patrimony to person holds 
good for the general patrimony and for the residual patrimony, once 
specially destined ones have been removed. The connection to personality 
lies in the fact that patrimony is active and dynamic, tied to the holder and 
his possibilities of earning, whereupon he gains credit ; it is not just a strict 
accounting of goods and debts. Earning power in a going concern is of 
greater value than its elements crystallized at their market value in liqui-
dation. "Il peut être comparé à un vase de fleurs dont la maîtresse de maison 
peut changer l'assortiment au gré de sa fantasie du moment, et dont l'effet 
est tout différent de celui de la botte cueillie par le jardinier"313. 
As to the character of the person's holding of his patrimony, this too, is 
a possibility. It remains possible to describe the holding of a patrimony as a 
right of property, once property is removed from the mastery or control 
which it was in classical theory. Not the right to drain all usefulness from the 
object owned, property is simply "la relation par 'laquelle une chose 
appartient à une personne". "Si le propriétaire ne peut toujours la retirer 
effectivement, il en conserve à tout moment l'expectative, la potentialité". 
Such a "belonging" covers rights as well as things, and could include the 
right of property itself314. 
Finally, Blondel holds out only a token number of rights which cannot 
be patrimonialized, at least not by transmission upon death. Intransmis-
sibility is the exception, not the rule. For, while withholding from inter vivos 
transmission those rights whose purpose is the protection of the physical and 
moral individual, and thus lack market value, even these may be not strictly 
personal, but familial315. That criterion is a question of fact; and, presu-
mably, if some use could be found for transmitting them, then they could be 
transmitted. The only other rights intransmissible would be civil liberties, 
because they involve an unlimited possibility for action ; but his distinction 
of these from "faculties", which are not unlimited and unconditioned but 
depend on the play of legal conditions in a number of combinations limited 
in advance, and so are transmissible, shows how faint such a dividing line 
remains316. 
313. F.H. SPETH, supra, note 45, p. 134, no. 145. 
314. S. GINOSSAR, supra, note 18, p. 32, no. 120; he finds such a phrase as the final one, 
however, an excès de subtilité for some unexpressed reason, p. 42, no. 16, n.75. 
315. P. BLONDEL, supra, note 23, p. 3. 
316. Id., p. 112, no. 127. 
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6. Patrimony and personhood 
The status of the concept of patrimony in Quebec civilian law may now 
be evaluated. First, it has only a limited range of exercise. No Quebec, 
French or Roman legal institutions require it in a codai text; almost no 
Quebec or Roman doctrine appeals to it ; the French doctrine which did so 
has been displaced ; and it is indispensible in the draft Quebec code to only 
one institution, namely, the extrapatrimoniality which is defined over 
against it. Secondly, the concept of patrimony is insufficient to perform even 
that limited exercise. Neither concept of patrimony, subjective or objective, 
suffices to define extrapatrimoniality. 
The subjective model of patrimony took up four chapters of this study. 
It involved an ambiguity which destroyed its usefulness : it is both thing and 
right ; and as right it is both a particular right of property, and the right of 
property over all property rights. The ambiguity is not, as the draft code 
suggests, an aberration which can be cleared up by selecting one side 
distinctly ; for it is the product of the concept of rights, of will and of person 
whence it issues. The absolute will which determines autonomously the 
existence of person assimilates into personal unity the multiple distinctions 
between rights, as well as the objects whence come those distinctions. The 
object is assimilated in volition because it is constituted in cognition, and so 
the ambiguity is unavoidable. This means also the destruction of extra-
patrimoniality, for the rights distinct from patrimonial rights are distinct 
only provisionally. The thing assimilated to person can be kept distinct from 
him only for localized purposes. The right of property has in draft no longer 
the absoluteness required for the classical distinction. But be it as absolute as 
wished, an insuperable dilemma ensues, recognized by even the main conduit 
of patrimonial theory, Savigny. If so absolute that the object is assimilated to 
person, then no distinction from extrapatrimonial rights can be discovered ; 
but if the objects remain distinct from person because their absolute control 
is what makes up personality, there still is implied no control over oneself, 
no extrapatrimonial rights which would interest the law. There may be such ; 
but patrimoniality does not define them. 
The objective model of patrimony was launched in the fifth chapter 
upon these recognized deficiencies. It remedies them by separating patrimony 
from the definition of personality as rights. Patrimony is a concrete unity : a 
sum of things. It is unified as a shorthand for the accounting which protects 
other persons ; it is concrete because it describes what components are as a 
matter of fact present within it. But from this contingent fact nothing of 
logical or conceptual necessity can be inferred. There is no implication in this 
descriptive unity that some elements factually outside of it must be 
proscribed from entering it. Anything outside patrimony is so only as a 
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matter of fact ; and so it may as a matter of subsequent fact enter patrimony. 
Its extrapatrimoniality is purely negative: nothing in its nature keeps it 
outside, but it just happens to be outside. There may be some reason for it to 
remain outside ; but that reason must arise upon considerations other than 
the definition of patrimony. 
The solution to the problems of objective patrimony comes from the 
same source as does the model for it which its exponents use, namely, the 
model presented by Maurice Hauriou317. His definition of patrimony as "La 
comptabilité toujours ouverte d'un compte unique" is lifted out of his 
discussion of the reality of legal personality. The definition of patrimony is 
given as an example of one of the most important legal fictions, along with 
capacity and its distinction between jouissance and exercise of rights. These 
fictions' role is to ensure continuity and identity to the "organic indivi-
duality" of groups, that is, to the ever-changing reality of the concepts and 
wills of the singular persons interacting in the group. Legal fictions give 
unity to this data by "representing" it ; legal personality is a reality insofar as 
the organic individuality is represented by such fictions. Legal personality is 
thus founded on something other than the moral personality of the 
individual. For example, succession is based not just on the deceased's will, 
for the social group imposes rules in its own interest, its interest being in a 
stability given by continuity. In a Bergsonian phrase Hauriou uses frequently, 
without this stability the singular realities would "ignite like paper flowers", 
be exhausted in their momentary appearance ; this is later the source for 
Hauriou's theory of institution. Therefore, "ces traits de la personne jurique 
trouvent leur origine dans les représentations mentales communes à tous les 
membres du groupe". 
In the role Hauriou assigns it here, patrimony remains both indis-
pensible and universal, for it is both imposed by all the members for their 
communal survival, and is common to them all. But its universality is neither 
subjectively dependent on the will of each subject of rights, nor is it 
objectively reducible to the objects included. Its universality is personal : the 
objective existence of the person (group or singular) comes to subjective 
recognition of itself. Patrimony remains a necessary institution, but only 
hypothetically. That is, some representation of singular facts is required, and 
patrimoniality is one way to fulfill this requirement, a way which is 
acceptable as long as misunderstandings of it do not rob it of efficacy. 
Similarly, extrapatrimoniality is able to be given a standing adjusted to 
a more adequate notion of personhood. Instead of being based on either the 
subjective will of inviolably inaccessible personality, or else on the bundling 
317. Supra, note 296. 
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of the person's acts into a package practicable for momentary purposes, 
these personal rights are the way he realizes himself publicly. He is immune 
from attack not simply because he is inacessible, nor because it is not yet 
useful to the collectivity to attack him, but because his public existence is at 
this time being realized in this public way318. 
Extrapatrimoniality is defined, then, no longer as the protection from 
the threats of patrimony ; for patrimony as properly understood does not 
threaten, and extrapatrimoniality as improperly understood does not protect. 
Instead, the two classes of rights are, in the famous words of Rand in 
Saumur : "at once the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of 
human beings and the primary conditions of their community life within a 
legal order" 319. Without such a notion, the project of the draft to protect 
person from patrimony cannot be realized by any dispositions ; with it, both 
the old and the new dispositions suffice. 
318. This "Institutional" alternative, of legal personhood hardly more than mentioned here in 
property law, is developed at greater length : in the law of persons by "The Concept of 
Person for Medica Law", (1981) 11 Revue de droit, 341; and in public law by the 
contribution, "Must Quebec Nationalism be Racist? Delos and La Nation", to the 
S. French anthology, Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation/La confédération 
canadienne, qu'en pensent les philosophes?, Montreal, Canadian Philosophical Association, 
1979. At yet greater length: The Methodology of Maurice Hauriou, C.U.A., 1970, and 
Tradition in Social Science, tr. from Hauriou, 1976, both unpublished. 
319. Though used there only of civil liberties (extrapatrimonial rights), and not of civil rights 
(patrimonial rights). See Saumur v. City of Quebec [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299. 
